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Abstract 
The idea of cross or multiculturalism in today’s rhetorical scholarship is essential 
because it allows scholars to apply a critical perspective to traditional modes of rhetorical 
scholarship. Many contemporary scholars, such as George Kennedy, Xing Lu, Roberta 
Blinkley and Carol Lipson have recently embraced a cross-cultural rhetorical perspective in 
their works. At the same time, other scholars have critiqued the traditional canon as too 
limiting and too reliant on notions of rationality, logic, antagonism and truth. Sonja Foss 
and Cindy Griffin provide one such critique of the Greco-Roman tradition by approaching 
the idea of rhetoric through an invitational lens that focuses on values of equality, 
immanent value, and self-determination, and seeks to use these values to de-center the 
Platonic/Aristotelian notion of rhetoric as antagonistic argument and persuasion. I want to 
consider the possibility that the underlying values offered by Foss and Griffin in their 
efforts to counter Aristotelian rhetoric productively resonate with the rhetorical visions 
developed in other ancient culture’s rhetoric. More specifically, in this thesis I seek to 
explore the resonance between the values of invitational rhetoric and the rhetorical values 
and styles of two prominent ancient Chinese traditions: Confucianism and Daoism. I aim to 
show that Foss and Griffin’s principles of equality, immanent value, and self-determination 
can be found within the ancient texts of China and serve as an unconscious reminder that 
the cross-cultural ideas influencing our rhetorical archives often times go unacknowledged.  
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Introduction 
 Contemporary rhetorical scholars have recently embraced a cross-cultural 
rhetorical perspective in their work. George Kennedy argues rhetorical scholars must “go 
beyond the Greco-Roman canon to examine the rhetorical nature of communication in non-
Western cultures” (Kennedy 220). Alongside Kennedy, Xing Lu uses the term “multi-cultural 
rhetoric” to describe the phenomenon of looking beyond individual cultural lenses in order 
to see rhetorical traditions as “traditions”, instead of centering all traditions around one 
tradition (Lu 13). She emphasizes the importance of other rhetorical traditions by focusing 
on ancient cultures. In the same regard, Carol Lipson and Roberta Binkley write, “the 
western world has canonized Aristotelian/Platonic rhetoric as Rhetoric, with its sanctioned 
principles, goals and conventions. But recent scholarship increasingly recognizes the need 
to extend the historical understanding of rhetoric in a variety of ways” (Lipson & Binkley 1). All 
of these authors imply that relying on Greco-Roman standards for rhetorical training and 
scholarship alone is problematic and contemporary scholars should look to other cultures 
and traditions for rhetorical insight. 
The idea of cross or multiculturalism in today’s rhetorical scholarship is essential 
because it allows scholars to apply a critical perspective to traditional modes of rhetorical 
scholarship. Even today, we still look to Greco-Roman canons for a “classical” 
understanding of rhetoric and utilize Aristotelian logic to validate or substantiate 
rhetorical claims. I argue that there is a need for contemporary rhetorical scholars to 
expand beyond “traditional” (Greco-Roman) modes of rhetorical understanding. If we, as 
scholars, limit ourselves to the perspectives and assumptions of a single rhetorical 
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tradition, we limit our own potential for academic growth. The best way to look beyond the 
limitations of a single culture’s viewpoint is to question the assumptions and canons that 
hold the culture’s communicative tradition together.    
 Rhetoricians and historians are not the only scholars who find the Greco-Roman 
tradition difficult. Other scholars have critiqued the traditional canon as too limiting and 
too reliant on notions of rationality, logic, antagonism and truth. Many of these challenges 
begin by noting the ways the Greco-Roman tradition reifies traditional masculine 
assumptions including the idea that persuasion involves “proving” that one side is right 
through the “force” of the better argument. Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin provide one such 
critique of the Greco-Roman tradition by approaching the idea of rhetoric from a 
perspective influenced by feminist philosophy. Foss and Griffin’s concept of invitational 
rhetoric focuses on values of equality, immanent value, and self-determination, and seeks 
to use these values to de-center the Platonic/Aristotelian notion of rhetoric as antagonistic 
argument and persuasion. 
Historians such as Kennedy and Lipson have undertaken parallel projects to 
contemporary theorists like Foss and Griffin and this thesis seeks to intervene in the space 
between these parallel projects. Ultimately, I want to consider the possibility that the 
underlying values offered by Foss and Griffin in their efforts to counter Aristotelian 
rhetoric productively resonate with the rhetorical visions developed in other ancient 
culture’s rhetoric. More specifically, in this thesis I seek to explore the resonance between 
the values of invitational rhetoric and the rhetorical values and styles of two prominent 
ancient Chinese traditions: Confucianism and Daoism. Before turning to a more detailed 
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discussion of these traditions and the resonances I seek to explore, it is useful to consider 
the concept of invitational rhetoric more carefully.   
 
What is Invitational Rhetoric? 
Aristotelian thought teaches us that rhetoric is one’s ability to find the available 
means of persuasion in any given situation (Bizzell 181). This conceptualization of rhetoric 
structures the way contemporary rhetorical culture is studied and further added to. Sonja 
Foss and Cindy Griffin offer a different perspective that depicts rhetoric as a form that 
reduces the imposing nature of persuasion to its a priori form of offering an invitation. The 
first step of any interaction is an invitation to engage and it is not until the invitation occurs 
that persuasion takes root. Thus, invitational rhetoric (IR) serves to reduce the role of a 
speaker to the initial invitational for interaction so as not to oppress an audience. 
Foss and Griffin introduce the idea that the classic Aristotelian definition of rhetoric 
as persuasion implicitly displays patriarchal bias: “interaction processes have typically 
been characterized essentially and primarily in terms of persuasion, influence, and power” 
(Foss & Griffin 2). These interaction processes are constantly occurring and are characterized 
by, according to Foss and Griffin, the assumption that humans are on this earth to alter 
their environment or to have power and influence over the interactions of others. Seeing 
this type of communication as oppressive, Foss and Griffin utilize feminist theory to 
identify invitational rhetoric as an ”invitation to understanding as a means to create a 
relationship rooted in equality, immanent value, and self-determination” (Foss &Griffin 5). 
Through an invitational lens, the classic “means to an end” changes so that the “means” 
become the “end” and the process of inviting an audience to understand a message 
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becomes the speaker’s only goal. This provides an audience security from the oppression of 
persuasive speech as well as freedom from a speaker’s influence. IR is a shift in thinking 
that respects and appreciates all perspectives, even if it is not what the speaker desires.  
Invitational rhetoric is rooted in three core feminist values: (1) equality, (2) 
immanent value and (3) self-determination. Equality functions similarly in IR as it does in 
feminism; namely, IR “is based on a commitment to the creation of relationships of equality 
and to the elimination of the dominance and elitism that characterize most human 
relationships” (Foss & Griffin 4). IR seeks to replace the competitive and patriarchal 
dehumanization that accompanies relationships based on dominance with a mode of 
communication that elicits camaraderie. The hope is to diminish the role of the ego in 
conversation and open up new avenues for discussion.  
Take, for example, a tourist in a foreign country; when a tourist explores a city that 
he or she has never been to, they will most likely ask for directions. If the tourist is 
demanding in their attempt to attain information, they will typically be unsuccessful. In this 
case, the tourist’s dominant style of speech is off-putting and no local person would go out 
of his or her way to help a demanding and rude individual. In this situation, asking for 
directions implies that the tourist needs help from another person. When someone is in 
need of help, the last thing they want to do is act as if they are better than the person trying 
to help them. At the very least, the tourist should consider the local’s opinion as equal to his 
or her own. By diminishing one’s desire to direct or control conversation, they become 
more welcoming and less threatening. IR wants communication to happen in this manner: a 
communicative relationship where each participant does not try and control the thoughts 
of others, but rather recognizes the equality shared between speaker and listener.  
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IR’s second component emphasizes creating communication that recognizes the 
immanent value of every living being. For Foss and Griffin, the essence of immanent value 
“is that every being is a unique and necessary part of the pattern of the universe and thus 
has value” (Foss & Griffin 4). IR teaches that value is something that cannot be socially 
constructed because it is innate to each individual and no person has the power to ascribe 
or ramify another person’s worth and value in IR. Thus, a person should accept the value of 
others as something that is unique to them and cannot be infringed upon, thereby 
eliminating any desire to engage in communicative methods that seek to manipulate the 
thoughts of others. According to the principle of immanent value, a person should accept 
different perspectives as opportunities to learn and foster personal growth.   
The final principle of IR is self-determination, a principle grounded in a respect for 
others. Foss and Griffin write, “self-determination allows individuals to make their own 
decisions about how they wish to live their lives, (and) involves the recognition that 
audience members are the authorities of their own lives and accords respect to others’ 
capacity and right to constitute their words as they choose” (Foss & Griffin 4). This principle 
goads the speaker to harness their own agency in conversation and trust that others are in 
control of their thoughts and actions. The principle of self-determination sees others as 
their own expert and thus redirects the speaker’s attention back to his or her own 
thoughts, questions, and ideas. As a result, with a conscious appreciation for the equality, 
self-determination, and immanent value of another, the rhetor becomes a being that does 
not judge others’ perspectives, but rather appreciates them.   
In the end, the speaker gains more from an interaction involving IR because it 
invites individuals to do more than just communicate and it allows each person to 
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acknowledge, respect, and appreciate more than just his or her own perspective. The hope 
is that by accepting others’ perspectives instead of trying to control them, one’s own 
perspective will evolve and reshape from having experienced many differing views. Ryan 
and Natalle emphasize, “both participants must recognize that in trying to reach 
understanding, they have to consider what they bring to the interpretive moment and yield 
assumptions and misunderstandings to better understand the other person’s perspective” 
(79). It is only when a person chooses to see others’ perspectives as an opportunity to learn 
and understand that rhetoric transforms into an art of understanding and persuading.   
Since Foss and Griffin unpacked IR in Beyond Persuasion, the ripples have spread 
throughout multiple areas of rhetorical scholarship. For example, feminist rhetorical theory 
has cited IR in many recent works; one such example is a dissertation written by Laura 
Field on feminist pedagogy in composition studies (2011). IR has extended into 
performance study as seen in a recent dissertation by Diana Tigerlily on “fractal 
performativity” (2009) and also into classroom pedagogical practices with last year’s thesis 
submission at the University of Iowa State, “Embracing civility, community, and citizenship: 
A qualitative study of multimodal college composition classrooms”. The guiding message of 
IR is that no limit should exist forcing one to choose between persuasion and invitation as a 
rhetorical style.    
Framing the Issue  
Foss and Griffin’s invitational rhetoric is appealing because it attempts to move 
away from traditional modes of understanding rhetoric by establishing a system based on 
an initial invitation and nothing more. IR is Foss and Griffin’s attempt at avoiding the pitfall 
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of applying dominating and oppressive modes of speech, which they often criticize in their 
work. Despite their careful footing, Foss and Griffin still fall victim to a binary, which they 
created, that divides invitational rhetoric from Aristotelian rhetoric. If one is to try and use 
invitational rhetoric as a critique of Aristotelian logic, then they end up in a contradiction 
that is being critical of Aristotle while simultaneously telling people that they should not be 
critical, but rather be invitational. While the message behind invitational rhetoric is 
encouraging, it still comes across as antagonistic and contradictory in that by making their 
argument, Foss and Griffin undermine their ability to make the argument. Despite its 
shortcomings, one must not throw the baby out with the bathwater and assume that 
nothing in IR is valuable. Such a blatant disregard would also be falling into the trap of 
thinking in terms of oppositions and binaries.  
Foss and Griffin’s three core principles reflect a conscious desire to be released from 
the imposing nature of rhetoric as persuasion. Ekaterina Haskins writes, “We do need to 
challenge the perception of homogeneity and historical transcendence…a potentially 
fruitful approach would be to consider the canonical texts alongside each other as voices in 
a cultural debate that is situated in time and place” (Haskins 198). Take for example a culture 
such as ancient China, situated roughly around the 5th-3rd century BCE, approximately the 
same time period as ancient Greece. I aim to show that IR’s principles of equality, 
immanent value, and self-determination can be found within the ancient texts of China and 
serve as an unconscious reminder that the cross-cultural ideas influencing our rhetorical 
archives often times go unacknowledged.  
In the following two chapters, I argue that the principles of IR resonate with ancient 
Daoist and Confucian texts in particular places within each text: Confucianism identifies 
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with the principles of equality and self-determination, while Daoism finds its similarities to 
the principles of equality and immanent value. Although I am selectively specifying 
particular places where IR values are present, I recognize that I am simultaneously 
deflecting all the other places where they might also surface. Many times the principles of 
immanent value and self-determination are present simultaneously and work to 
supplement each other and catalyze readers’ thought process. Therefore, despite the fact 
that IR values can be found within both ancient traditions in many coinciding locations, I 
am specifying that particular values are predominately found in particular places. This is 
neither a hindrance toward nor a catalyst for the resonation occurring between the two 
traditions, but rather a way to create clarity when comparing ancient Chinese culture and 
contemporary Western rhetorical theory.   
When looking through the lens of a foreign tradition, one must understand and use 
the appropriate terms associated with that culture’s tradition. Despite the term ‘rhetoric’ 
not appearing in any ancient Chinese communicative tradition, there were many terms that 
paralleled it’s meaning. Therefore, when I refer to ancient Confucianism or Daoism as being 
rhetorical, I am considering the teachings alongside what contemporary scholarship 
(influenced by Greco-Roman) defines rhetoric to be, not as what the ancient Chinese 
cultures thought rhetoric was. This is a necessary distinction to make for accessing the 
potency of a different culture’s rhetorical tradition.  
It is difficult to enunciate the exact relationship shared between ancient China and 
IR. Although the two are comparably similar, their foundations are rooted in and influenced 
by topological time periods that are virtually incomparable. Therefore, to say that IR 
“transposes onto”, “is influenced by”, or even “relates to” an ancient Chinese rhetorical style 
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would simply be an incomplete portrayal of the precise mutuality between the two. For my 
purposes, I will use the concept of resonance to help bridge the gap between the two 
traditions. The concepts in ancient Confucianism and Daoism, despite their topographical 
and topological positioning, view the world at a similar frequency, as if each tradition has a 
similar hum and even though they cannot hear one another, the ideas of Confucian and 
Daoist scholars resonate with Foss and Griffin’s ideal invitational method of 
communicating.  
My intent is to juxtapose Foss and Griffin’s core principles of IR with the Chinese 
rhetorical tradition in order to promote the idea of cross-cultural rhetoric in contemporary 
scholarship. I look specifically at the Confucian and Daoist texts of Confucius, Laozi, 
Mencius, and Chuang Tzu in order to ascertain a unique rhetorical style among the ancient 
Chinese schools of thought. Rather than focusing on the pedagogical pursuit of persuasion, 
Daoist and Confucian traditions utilized a variety of rhetorical strategies ranging from 
metaphors and anecdotes to paradoxes and rituals in order to guide their audience toward 
an ‘enlightened’ conclusion.  Using a variety of translations, I assert that the rhetorical 
styles found in ancient Confucianism and Daoism resonate with contemporary Western 
rhetorical concepts rooted in invitational rhetoric.  
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Chapter 1: Confucianism  
Confucius grew up and lived in a country that was divided both politically and 
linguistically. Feeling the effects of this cultural divide, Confucius developed an unyielding 
belief in ming bian, or distinction when naming. Confucius believed that in order to create 
meaning one should consider distinction and clarity above all else. He sought to minimize 
the relationship between words and their meanings to a clean, lucid and efficient system 
that allowed speakers to honestly and ethically engage their audience. From the doctrines 
put forth by Confucius, many others were motivated to follow his system. For example, 
Mencius, another notable Confucian scholar, was an intellectual who became largely 
responsible for Confucianism’s spreading throughout China nearly a hundred years after 
Confucius. He traveled on foot between the different feudal kingdoms and, with a rhetorical 
form slightly different from Confucius, convinced kings, servants, peasants and government 
officials that Confucianism was the morally correct path. Though the rhetorical forms of 
Confucius and Mencius were staunchly different, their styles exhibited similar rhetorical 
devices, many of which resonate with contemporary invitational rhetoric.  
In this chapter, I look at Confucius’s Analects and the Mencius to identify similarities 
in the two author’s rhetorical style. Furthermore, I argue the same principles that give 
shape to both Confucius and Mencius’s rhetorical style resonate with contemporary 
scholars Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin’s invitational rhetoric. It is important to focus on the 
rhetorical style of ancient Confucianism because style creates meaning and meaning, 
according to Confucius, must be distinct in that, “you persuade a man only insofar as you 
can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude, idea, (and) 
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identifying your ways with his” (Oliver 4). In Confucianism, style dictates the way toward 
ming bian and thus, the rhetorical styles of Confucius and Mencius provide valuable insight 
on one way of approaching the formation of a communicative tradition.  
Neither the Mencius nor the Analects are considered to be written entirely by either 
scholar, but are instead agreed to be compositions that come from the writings and 
teachings of many of Mencius and Confucius’s descendants and disciples. While it may be 
difficult to discern a rhetorical style from translations alone because their historical 
accuracy is called into question, it is important to note that the actual Chinese characters of 
the texts are in themselves only one way of reading the text’s intended message. Thus, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that each translation has its own historicity and can be beneficial 
in that they provide a larger, more diverse perspectives on the heuristics behind the 
Analects and the Mencius. Considering that both the Analects and the Mencius were written 
in ancient Chinese characters, the primary texts for this analysis are direct translations of 
ancient Chinese documents. In this chapter, I will use some of the more notable translations 
for both the Mencius and the Analects by Simon Leys, James Legge, D.C. Lau and Raymond 
Dawson. Although looking at the stylistic decisions of Confucian texts through translations 
may not be a direct link to the historical words of the actual scholars, they do offer an 
access point to a tradition that is otherwise inaccessible. Translations do make it difficult to 
know whether or not the voice in the translation is the same as the actual voice of the 
historical figure, but it is still valuable to consider the topological significance of each 
translation as it was written historically. 
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My purpose in this analysis will be to identify the resonance occurring between the 
ancient Confucian style and two of Foss and Griffin’s principles for invitational rhetoric: 
equality and self-determination. Even though Confucius and Mencius differed in their 
rhetorical form (Mencius’s dialogues were anecdotal and analytical whereas Confucius’s 
were more instructional), we can still find the same invitational values in the greater 
Confucian rhetorical style. The final section concludes with a summary of the two scholar’s 
rhetorical style and a further reifying of the resonance occurring between Foss and Griffin’s 
principles of equality and self-determination and the two Confucian texts.   
Historical Context 
Confucianism gained popularity during the Warring States period of China (480-422 
BCE), when China underwent its first major unification (Fung 17). It was a time where power 
and influence were spread pervasively throughout many different feudal kingdoms, each of 
which had their own art of warfare, language and system for agriculture (Fung 17). As a 
result, many different dialects developed in these kingdoms making communication 
amongst Chinese people very difficult and ambiguous, even if they lived in a similar place 
topographically. It was not until the unification of China that Confucianism was mandated 
as the philosophical and moral system for institutionalized education. Once implemented, 
Confucianism addressed the issue of ambiguity in the Chinese language by mandating 
uniformity and focusing on crafting clarity in meaning and stability in an individual’s 
ethical structuring.      
Confucius lived during the transition between the Zhou dynasty and the Spring-
Autumn period in China (751-479 BCE), which was a time wrought with political disorder 
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and uncertainty (Watson 179). According to the Historical Records, Confucius was poor in his 
youth, until he entered the government of Lu where by the time he was fifty, he had 
reached high official rank. As a result of political intrigue, however, he was soon forced to 
resign his post and go into exile. For the next thirteen years he traveled from one state to 
another looking for an opportunity to actualize his ideal for political and social reform. He, 
however, was unsuccessful and finally, as an old man, returned to Lu where he died three 
years later in 479 BCE (Fung 38). When Confucius died, it is recorded that his last words 
were regret that “none among the rulers then living possessed the sagacity requisite to a 
proper appreciation of his ethical philosophy and teachings” (Dawson v). 
At the age of 52, Confucius was appointed chief magistrate of the city of Chung-tu, 
where he was later appointed minister of crime by the Duke of Lu because of his 
prominence in Chung-tu (Dawson xviii). It was there that Confucius bore witness to the moral 
decay of the Zhou government, which, in turn, motivated him to use his aristocratic 
background to reconstruct an orderly society that abided by the prescribed moral 
principles and cultural norms of Confucian doctrine. Even before composing the six 
classical texts of Confucianism, Confucius was credited as the first man in China to make 
teaching his profession, and thus popularize culture and education (Fung 40-1).   
Another scholar, most notably remembered for his additions to the Confucian 
tradition, was Mencius. Robert Oliver writes of Mencius, “Among all the Confucian 
rhetoricians, Mencius was notable for his penetrating understanding of the subjectivity of 
the human mind…He declared ‘The Way of Truth is a great road. It is not difficult to know 
it. The evil is only that men will not seek it out’” (Oliver 5). Whereas Confucius was a humble 
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man who did not enjoy speaking about issues of the divine, Mencius was noted for his 
boldness and declared that righteous virtuosity was the principle component in a rhetorical 
tradition; he writes, “In the world there are three things which command universal respect 
and honor. These are nobility, age and virtue. At court, nobility is most important; in the 
village, age is most important; in exercising influence over the people, these two cannot 
match virtue” (Oliver 5). It is my opinion that Mencius’s brazen character was a result of the 
political time he lived in. Confucius being the first to produce Confucian doctrine was only 
concerned with creating an ethical system revolving around ren (benevolence) and ming 
bian and did not feel the burden of having to defend it. Mencius, however, came well after 
Confucian principles had been solidified and lived in a time where competing schools of 
thought were on the rise. Consequently, it is common for Mencius’s character to be 
portrayed in a way that is solely focused on righteousness and virtue. While this is not 
necessarily inaccurate, it cannot be taken as a detailed description of Mencius. It is 
important to understand that Mencius’s politically charged motivation to compete with 
other up and coming traditions on Confucianism’s behalf naturally produced a more 
rational, argumentative and righteous character for Mencius. This must be kept in mind 
when making qualitative comparisons about why Confucius’s rhetorical form is different 
from Mencius.  
Mencius was the Confucian scholar most responsible for the spread of Confucianism 
throughout China. Originally named Meng Ke, Mencius was born to an aristocratic family in 
decline, which ended him up in poverty. This life factor contributed to why Mencius, like 
Confucius, became an educator instead of a politician. As a scholar, Mencius became linked 
to Confucius through his studies as a disciple of Tzu-ssu, who in turn was Confucius’s 
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grandson (Fung 68). For a while, Mencius lived the life of a scholar at the Chi-hsia center of 
learning where most of the scholars living there were, according to the Historical Records, 
“ranked as great officers and were honored and courted by having large houses built for 
them on the main road. This was to show to all the pensioned guests of the feudal lords that 
it was the state of Ch’i that could attract the most eminent scholars of the world” (Fung 68).  
Much of Mencius’s life was spent growing up in the Warring States period of China 
when “cultural values were articulated and divisive power struggles had come to an end…It 
was a period of tension between moral choice and utilitarian gains, of debates over 
philosophical thoughts and political formulas for the reconstruction of society” (Lu 170). 
This period in China’s history, characterized by strong divisive ideas, forced Mencius to 
constantly justify and defend Confucianism against up-and-coming competitive schools 
such as Legalism, Mohism and Daoism. As a result, Mencius spent his lifetime traveling to 
different states promoting Confucian doctrine, arguing with his contemporaries, and 
offering advice to kings.  
Confucius and Mencius are considered to be two of the most influential Confucian 
scholars that lived, with Mencius coming nearly 90 years after Confucius. Though the two 
men’s philosophies and rhetorical forms differed, they both held ming bian to be the most 
important aspect of their teachings; “that is, things in actual fact should be made to accord 
with the implications attached to them by names” (Fung 41). The Mencius and Confucius’s 
Analects are two prominent texts in Confucianism that are exemplars of its rhetorical style. 
Whereas classic Western canons prescribe rhetoric as a form of persuasion, the ancient 
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Chinese tradition values subtlety in speech and goads its audience to discover their own 
conclusions about Chinese philosophy and morality. 
 It is important to note that ancient Confucianism did not start off as a highly 
esteemed system. In fact, it was only one of several competing schools of thought during 
the Spring-Autumn period (722-468 BCE) and the Warring States period of China (403-221 
BCE) (Watson 179). It was not until Emperor Han Wu (156-87 BCE) institutionalized 
Confucianism as the official state teaching for philosophy and cultural ideology that it 
gained dominance (Fung 205). However, in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Confucianism came under 
attack by Western-educated Chinese scholars, which ultimately influenced Mao Zedong to 
ostracize it as a state ideology. As a result, Confucian texts were no longer taught to 
schoolchildren in Mainland China. Even though Confucian principles are still studied today, 
the question of accuracy and legitimacy has become an increasing concern due to the 
erosion of authentic Confucian scholars (Lu 154).    
Philosophical Overview  
Confucianism is particularly relevant to rhetoric due to its affinity for creating 
‘perfect’ speech. It is important to note that my use of ‘rhetoric’ in relation to the Confucian 
system is not an attempt to prescribe Greek influences on the ancient Chinese tradition. I 
am rather using the term as a point of relation to help the reader make the connection 
between what ‘rhetoric’ is typically understood to be and how it functions in ancient 
Confucianism. Confucius believed that despite its idealistic and altogether unattainable 
nature, perfecting speech was a goal worth striving for. For Confucius, proper naming was 
the key to proper speech and separated Confucianism from the other ancient Chinese 
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traditions. Whereas, “Confucius emphasized the rectification of names and demonstrated 
an interest in the moral and aesthetic use of language…Mencius held a critical view of types 
of immoral speech, focusing on the affective aspect of argumentation” (Lu 155). In other 
words, Confucius was more focused on ming bian, while Mencius specialized in refining 
good human nature.  
Both Confucius and Mencius focused on the morality of human nature in their 
ideology. Confucius emphasized three general principles that subsequently became 
fundamental building blocks for many other schools of thought in ancient China: (1) ren- 
benevolence, (2) li- moral rights and rituals, (3) zhong yong- the Middle Way. Though many 
other Chinese schools of thought share these concepts in their philosophical views, 
Confucianism was the first to institutionalize them. 
In Confucianism, ren represents the primordial goal of human nature and was what 
Confucius considered to be the closest thing to ‘perfect virtue’. Ren has a variety of 
definitions (in the Analects it was defined 87 times) that include: moral excellence, 
benevolence, human heartedness, good judgment and gentility (Legge, Leys, Fung, Lau). For 
Confucius, ren was the accomplishment of a scholar whose values lie in the acquisition of 
knowledge and self-improvement. Ren is the base material essence of all humans and 
accounts for why “a father acts according to the way a father should act who loves his son; 
a son acts according to the way a son should act who loves his father…The man who really 
loves others is one able to perform his duties in society” (Fung 42). The result of proper ren 
is the attainment of not just proper virtue, but all kinds of virtue, which can be seen as a 
form of ‘perfect virtue’. For this reason, the hierarchical nature of the Confucian system 
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categorized its subjects according to their “moral sensibility, psychological state, and ability 
to relate to authority”; the morally superior ones were called junzi (gentlemen class) and 
the lower ones were xiaoren (base people) (Lu 158). Confucian followers strived to attain the 
ethical values of ren and, as a result, fueled Confucianism’s appeal among Chinese scholars 
and citizens. 
Confucianism’s second principle was li, or propriety and decorum. Confucius 
believed that a morally righteous man would do what was expected of him using methods 
approved by the Confucian system. For Confucius, persuasion was achievable if people 
realized that “one is not egocentrically trying to impress upon them his own idiosyncrasies 
of belief and manner, but is genteelly speaking and acting according to established social 
values and methods, (so that) they willingly accept his views as being essentially like their 
own” (Oliver 4). Though Confucius was a man of high ideals, his practice was one of 
pragmatism and hard work. For Confucius, a theory is not good unless it can be applied to 
the real world. If a person wants to achieve ren, then the proper execution of li would be 
the means to do so. Li represents more than a set of rules to follow, it represents a way of 
life that leads to the realization of ren.  
The final principle of Confucianism emphasizes the pursuit of balance, or the middle 
way (zhong yong). Zhong yong is the embodiment of justice, fairness and stability in the 
ancient Confucian system. It represents balance and harmony in the world and, according 
to Confucius, is the most difficult to attain; he says, “The Middle Way is the highest moral 
virtue and it has been lacking among the common people for quite a long time” (Lau 6.29.66). 
Confucius writes in the Analects, “In his dealings with the world the gentleman is not 
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invariably for or against anything. He is on the side of what is moral (appropriateness)” (Lau 
4.10.73). A scholar who accepts zhong yong does not have a want for one way or the other. 
The person who possesses this trait “is generous without costing him anything, works 
others hard without their complaining, has desires without being greedy, is casual without 
being arrogant, and is awe-inspiring without appearing fierce” (Lau 20.2.159). For Confucius, 
a life of kindness, ritual propriety and balance defined the philosophy of a junzi and helped 
mold Confucianism’s rhetorical style.  
When comparing the two scholars, Mencius and Confucius’s perspectives were not 
that different. Mencius, more than anything, served to enhance the preexisting Confucian 
principles. Taking into consideration both Mencius and Confucius’s topological position in 
the development of Confucianism, they should be thought of as dependent on and catalyzed 
by each other for the purpose of creating a more complete Confucian ideology. In his 
teachings, “Confucius condemned those glib individuals who spoke with eloquent and 
flowery words lacking in moral substance; (while) on the other hand, he stressed the need 
for a proper balance between zhi (simplicity) and wen (style)” (Lu 165). Consequently, 
Confucius’s rhetorical style shows a variety of methods for conveying proper and balanced 
meaning. To more clearly express this point, I would like to look at a quote from Confucius 
where he is asked about the nature of ren: “A craftsman who wishes to practice his craft 
well must first sharpen his tools. You should, therefore, seek the patronage of the most 
distinguished counselors and make friends with the most benevolent gentlemen” (Lau 
15.10.133). In this quote, Confucius’s rhetorical style utilized the metaphor of the craftsman 
as a vehicle for teaching his disciples how to correctly follow the path of ren.     
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Mencius, like Confucius, rooted his philosophy (and thus his rhetoric) in the 
conceptualization of ren. Therefore, his writings emphasize appeals to the moral side of 
human nature, which is very frequently supported by the use of metaphors and analogies. 
Unlike Confucius however, Mencius attached a notion of the divine to ren and thus, much of 
his ‘rhetoric’ focused on its proper cultivation and the correct use of speech. This most 
likely served as a way to gain many followers throughout his travels, which eventually 
allowed Mencius to become a key figure in the development of Confucianism.  
One of Mencius’s most notable expansions to Confucius’s teachings was 
incorporating a sense of divine power to ren. He argued that ren was the foundation on 
which li (rites), zhi (wisdom) and yi (righteousness) were built. Mencius’s fervent belief in 
the Mandate of Heaven (tian ming) allowed him to logically connect ren to divine power by 
implying that “humans are spiritual beings capable of making moral choices”; he believed 
that humans are capable of rectifying themselves and choosing the moral path as an act of 
will (Lu 171-2). For Mencius, the key to rectification was the human heart; he says, 
“benevolence is the heart of humans and righteousness is their path” (Mencius 6a.11.267). Ren 
is cultivated within the human heart and thus, any act of ren is an act of the heart. 
 For Mencius, wisdom and benevolence are intangibly linked and demand that one 
embrace the role of human emotions in rational thinking and value it as a skill tempered 
through li. By properly attending to one’s emotions, a Confucian follower can maintain their 
good morality and improve their ren. Mencius referred to this type of attainment as the 
Great Morale, whereby a man of Great Morale identifies himself with the universe and 
cultivates an understanding of dao that “pervades all between Heaven and Earth” (Fung 78). 
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Confucianism places a heavy emphasis on understanding the dao so that one can elevate 
their mind to a level in accordance with the proper cultivation of ren. Mencius would later 
label that same elevation of the mind ‘righteousness’ in order to motivate Confucian 
followers toward the “accumulation of righteousness; that is, the constant doing of what 
one ought to do in the universe as a ‘citizen of the universe’” (Fung 78). Though the two 
scholar’s go about discussing Confucian principles with different rhetorical forms, both 
adhere to the overarching principles of Confucianism and its essential goal: ming bian.      
Confucius: The Analects 
Simon Leys says, “The Analects is the only place where we can actually encounter 
the real, living Confucius” (Leys xix). Therefore, the best method of deducing a rhetorical 
style from the man Confucius is to look closely at his Analects. In this section, I will focus on 
Confucius’s use of style in the Analects to show the similarities between it and two of IR’s 
core principles: equality and self-determination. I will further break down the rhetorical 
style of Confucius’s Analects into three different rhetorical devices: (1) the use of 
juxtaposition to explain key concepts, (2) indirectness and ambiguity as a persuasive tactic, 
and (3) ritualization as a method of persuasion. The Analects frequently uses these three 
rhetorical devices in conjunction with each other and often, they are only effective because 
of the relationship they share. For the sake of simplicity, I will systematically move through 
each point as they have been listed, while pointing out instanced of their nuanced and 
codependent relationships as they surface.     
Confucius used the juxtaposition of ideas to explain key Confucian concepts in his 
Analects. He frequently placed opposite terms in direct contrast to one another so that a 
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moral and righteous path would be clearly visible. For example, “The Master said: A perfect 
man, I cannot hope to meet. I would be content if only I could meet a principled man. When 
nothing pretends to be something, emptiness pretends to be fullness, and penury pretends 
to be affluence, it is hard to have principles” (Leys 7.26.32). In this, Confucius juxtapositions 
value-terms to show that although perfection is unattainable, the principles that 
Confucianism associates with perfection can be achieved by distinguishing them from their 
abstractions (example: penury is the abstraction of affluence; recklessness is the 
perversion of courage).  
An example of Confucius’s use of juxtaposition at work is, “The Master said: A 
gentleman (junzi) seeks harmony, but not conformity. A vulgar man (xiaoren) seeks 
conformity, but not harmony” (Leys 13.23 64). Here there are two juxtapositions: the first is 
between the junzi and the xiaoren and the second is between harmony and conformity. A 
junzi is supposed to seek harmony, while not following blindly, by expressing opinions and 
coming to mutual understandings; whereas a xiaoren is cowardly in the face of injustice 
and cannot achieve harmony because he is motivated only by self-interests (Lu 167). 
Confucius’s statement about the junzi and the xiaoren, however, could not have occurred 
without the preceding question, “Zigong asked: How does one deserve to be called a 
gentleman?” (Leys 13.20 63) This question allowed Confucius to engage with Zigong in a 
pedagogical way because he was asked a question. The fact that Confucius was asked a 
question in the first place justified his lengthy response. It is important to note that the 
Analects occur entirely in dialogue form because juxtaposition, as a rhetorical device, is 
best achieved with a dialectical style. In this way, the Analects functions juxtaposition to 
itself by placing Confucius the master and junzi in opposition to Zigong the disciple and 
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xiaoren. Through dialogue, Confucius illustrates the juxtaposition of moral and ethical 
concepts in order to achieve persuasion, while simultaneously crafting his disciple’s ren 
through li. 
Dialectical juxtaposition is a rhetorical style seen in many different culture’s 
communicative methods and is not solely isolated to ancient China. In ancient Greece for 
instance, Plato’s Gorgias portrays the character Socrates arguing with a few different 
Sophists over the value of rhetoric as a field of study and as a profession. He debates the 
subject matter of rhetoric’s ineffectiveness with Gorgias and his student Polus, which 
culminates in a discussion between Socrates and Callicles (Bizzell 91,97-98).  Although 
Socrates succeeded in showing the ineffectiveness of rhetoric, he did so in a way that used 
rhetoric to denounce rhetoric. Plato places rhetoric and dialectics in juxtaposition within a 
text that is itself a dialectical juxtaposition between Socrates and his opponents. Plato’s 
Gorgias used dialectics to discuss the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic as a 
reversal strategy meant to put readers into a state of unawareness. It draws their attention 
away from the actual usage of rhetoric by verbally condemning it; it uses rhetoric to 
denounce rhetoric and it rhetorically persuades its audience that rhetoric is not persuasive. 
In a sense, by discussing rhetoric through dialectical juxtaposition, the character Socrates 
makes it difficult for an audience to focus on the instances of rhetoric’s effectiveness 
because it is hidden within its own juxtaposition.         
 Juxtaposition, as a rhetorical strategy in the Analects, is interesting because despite 
the master-student dichotomy, it encourages followers to participate in conversation with 
their masters as well as encourages masters to appreciate the value of their disciple’s 
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thoughts. Foss and Griffin label this type of care as the principle of equality: “one that is 
based on a commitment to the creation of relationships of equality and to the elimination of 
the dominance and elitism that characterize most human relationships” (Foss & Griffin 4). 
Confucius illustrates the connection between juxtaposition and equality by engaging with 
one of his disciples; “Zigong asked, which is the better: Zizhang or Zixia? The Master said: 
Zizhang overshoots and Zixia falls short. Zigong said: Then Zizhang must be the better? The 
Master said: both miss the mark” (Leys 11.16 51). The principle of equality functions on two 
levels in this example: the first being the actual conversation as a stylistic deployment in 
the Analects; the second being the equal worth of both Zizhang and Zixia as individuals. 
This exchange is a reflection of the Confucian principle zhong yong in that it critiques the 
nature of both Confucian students, labeling neither as superior. Even if one student was 
better than the other (i.e. Zizhang overshooting), the principle of zhong yong would not 
make that distinction.  
Considering that this entire interaction takes place within the Analects, the nature of 
this conversation makes it easy to forget that the conversation itself is Confucius’s rhetorical 
style at work. The use of a dialogue unconsciously teaches readers to value the worth of all 
perspectives equally because it forces the reader to read the opinions of individuals other 
than the master. Confucius teaches the reader a valuable lesson in zhong yong, while still 
maintaining respect for the students participating in conversation. Confucius’s use of 
dialectical juxtaposition is an exercise in equality meant to invite readers to understand the 
underlying Confucian principle in their own way (which is based off their interpretation of 
Confucius’s interactions with his disciples).      
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Another of Confucius’s rhetorical strategies was to implement ambiguity and 
indirectness (often times alongside the use of juxtaposition) to catalyze the reader’s 
creative thought process. Confucius’s use of indirect argumentation serves to guide his 
audience in a direction that, depending on his skillful deployment, brings the audience to 
the same conclusion as Confucius without him having to provide it. An example of this in 
the Analects is when Confucius says, “’I wish to speak no more’ The disciples were 
perplexed: ‘But, Master, if you do not speak, how would little ones like us still be able to 
hand down any teachings?’ Confucius replied: ‘Does Heaven speak? Yet the four seasons 
follow their course and the hundred creatures continue to be born. Does Heaven speak?’” 
(Leys xxxi-ii)  Confucius indirectly implies that the natural way (dao) will progress without 
Confucius’s teachings, but he does so without ever fully answer the question presented. It is 
as if Confucius is trying to put the emphasis on what he is not saying.  
The ambiguity in Confucius’s Analects constantly provokes the reader to take 
several moments to reconsider what exactly Confucius is saying. This gives the reader a 
chance to rely on his or her own opinion as a source of legitimacy instead of being 
inundated with others’ thoughts and opinions. Foss and Griffin define the IR principle of 
self-determination as allowing “individuals to make their own decisions about how they 
wish to live their lives, (it) involves the recognition that audience members are the 
authorities of their own lives and accords respect to others’ capacity and right to constitute 
their words as they choose” (Foss & Griffin 4). Confucius catalyzes one’s ability to act on their 
thoughts because he never fully explains himself.  
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When others are seen as experts who are making competent decisions about their 
lives, “efforts by a rhetor to change those decisions are seen as a violation of the expertise 
they have developed” (Foss & Griffin 4). Relying on an authority figure for information or 
instruction is no different than sitting in front of a television set absorbing the exterior 
influences of whatever mind-numbing program is currently playing; it allows for no stimuli 
that foster creative or subjective thought. The principle of self-determination is what 
makes a person turn the TV set off and redirect their attention back to their own thoughts 
and actions. By not forcing information on a person, the principle of self-determination 
encourages individuals to take hold of their own mind to allay the fear of losing one’s voice 
to the noise of the exterior world and the pressure of others’ thoughts.    
The application of IR’s principle of self-determination in Confucianism creates a side 
effect: an appreciation of silence as a rhetorical strategy. In IR, for one to access a self-
determined mindset, one must be free of the constant pressure and influence of others’ 
thoughts. Silence allows speakers to activate their self-determination by providing them 
with valuable void-space in conversation; space that is marked by a lack of verbal 
communication. Foss and Griffin use the works of Gendlin, Morton and Johnson to promote 
the idea of silence through their terms: absolute listening, hearing to speech and hearing 
into being; “In such rhetoric, listeners do not interrupt, comfort, or insert anything of their 
own as others tell of their experiences…Our advice, reactions, encouragements, 
reassurances, and well-intentioned comments actually prevent people from feeling 
understood…(by) speaking to listeners who do not insert themselves into the talk, 
individuals come to discover their own perspectives” (Foss & Griffin 11). These authors stress 
that the process of absolute listening requires silence in order to come to fruition. 
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Elias Canetti points out that the Analects makes significant use of the unsaid and 
articulates that the supreme virtue of humanity is marked in those that do not speak (Leys 
xxx). In a translation by James Legge, “Someone said (to the Master), ‘Yung is truly virtuous, 
but he is not ready with his tongue.’ The Master said, ‘what is the good of being ready with 
the tongue? They who encounter men with smartness of speech for the most part procure 
themselves hatred. I know not whether he be truly virtuous, but why should he show 
readiness of the tongue?’” (Legge 5.4.1-2 174) In this exchange, Legge highlights Confucius’s 
puzzlement over why the spoken word is so readily accepted as useful or as a mark of 
intelligence. In another translation of the same passage it says, “The Master said: What is 
the use of eloquence? An agile tongue creates many enemies” (Leys 5.5 19). In both 
translations, Confucius hints that what is good (ren) and what is eloquent are not 
necessarily correlated. He indirectly implies that one who is skillful with the tongue will 
“procure hatred’, or will “create many enemies”. Furthermore, one who makes enemies so 
easily cannot be on the path of ren because it betrays the prerequisite of benevolence 
toward humanity. For Confucius, “Clever talk and affected manners are seldom signs of 
goodness” (Leys 1.3 3). Confucius teaches his students, in an ambiguous manner, that 
eloquence can only arise as a result of having strayed from dao, for to be in accordance with 
the dao is to not focus on desires such as being eloquent or using flattering speech. From 
this example, one can see both Confucius’s indirect style and his use of juxtaposition 
between “readiness of the tongue” and the proper cultivation of ren. As a result, silence 
becomes a valuable tool for the Confucian scholar because it adheres to ming bian by 
denouncing verbosity and focusing the reader’s attention on what is unsaid and implied. 
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 The third rhetorical device in the Analects is the use of ritualization as a means to 
persuade. Ritualizing as a rhetorical strategy is effective because it influences individuals 
on an everyday basis. It is not, however, an oppressive or external everyday influence, but 
rather a self-imposed and self-created one. IR would label this a ‘self-determined’ process 
of ritualization. For one scholar, “The (Analects) is primarily concerned about various 
means for ritualizing individuals in order to bring them into alignment with symbolic acts 
that reflect the true spirit of the Way” (You 432). For Confucius, rituals are necessary because 
they catalyze the reader’s self-determination in their process of cultivating ren.   
Ritualization has an embedded connotation implying that it is a dead process: one 
that requires no active thought, but rather mindless repetition. While in many cases this 
can be true, Confucius uses rituals in an alive and inventive way. His insertion of rituals 
functions as a challenge for readers to see if they are capable of applying themselves to 
something. In this example Confucius says, “The man of distinction is solid an 
straightforward, and loves righteousness. He examines people’s words, and looks at their 
countenances. He is anxious to humble himself to others. Such a man will be distinguished 
in the country” (Legge 12.20.5 259). Although he provides the reader with the formula for 
improving oneself, it is left up to the individual to choose whether or not to adopt it. Even 
though there is only one proper way to cultivate ren and enact li (through the teachings of 
Confucius), there is still an inventive process that results from prescribing ritualized living. 
Confucius says, “A superior man may be made to go to the well, but he cannot be made to 
go down into it” (Legge 6.24 193). The choice is left up to the reader about what to do with a 
proposed ritual and it is the choice that makes the process of ritualization come alive for 
Confucius.     
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The choice Confucius gives to readers is catalyzed by IR’s principle of self-
determination. For example, in the very first line of the Analects, “The Master said: Is it not 
pleasant to learn with a constant perseverance and application?” (Legge 1.1 137) Why would 
Confucius begin his Analects with a challenge to the reader (a challenge IR would label as 
the principle self-determination) if not to provoke their thought process from the very 
start? It is Confucius’s hope that the reader will take the challenge and apply it 
ritualistically to all of Confucius’s teachings in the Analects. As a result, the reader comes up 
with his or her own interpretation of the Confucian principles. The ritualization that occurs 
throughout the Analects, in all its forms, is a self-imposed and self-created ritualistic 
process invoked by Confucius’s appeal to both ren and li; in order to cultivate ren, one must 
subjectively create an understanding of Confucius’s ambiguous style of teaching.  
One of the most commonly seen ritualistic appeals in Confucius’s Analects is an 
appeal to filial piety. In Leys’s translation, “The Master said: To learn something and then to 
put it into practice at the right time; is this not a joy?” Confucius continues with, “A 
gentleman (junzi) works at the root. Once the root is secured, the Way unfolds. To respect 
parents and elders is the root of humanity” (Leys 1.2 3). From the very beginning, Confucius 
emphasized the role of constant perseverance, especially in regard to filial piety. A proper 
junzi self-imposes a ritualistic mind frame that always puts his family before his name. 
Furthermore, Confucius stressed that in order to complete the ritualization process, what is 
learned must be accompanied by either practice or application; in order for a ritual to be a 
ritual, it must manifest through some form of doing (i.e. using an appeal to one’s family as a 
universal platform for refining the heuristics of proper ritualization). 
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For Confucius, a ritualized mind is one that hopes to improve ren and is habitually 
concerned about its relationships. In IR, the principle of equality functions as a way to strip 
down dominant methods of speech and elitism in human relationships so that subjects will 
place others before themselves in conversation. They say, “efforts to gain dominance 
and…power over others cannot be used to develop relationships of equality, so (IR) seeks 
to replace alienation, competition and dehumanization that characterize relationships of 
domination with intimacy, mutuality and camaraderie” (Foss & Griffin 4). In a sense, Foss and 
Griffin are prescribing a system of ethical behavior for structuring all human relationships. 
Just as Confucius stressed the need to cultivate proper ren, IR wants people to consistently 
apply a selfless perspective to improve the quality and openness of conversation. The 
desire to improve one’s ren and maintain positive personal relationships entices readers to 
actively want to apply the Confucian ethical system ritualistically. 
Confucius relied on the process of ritualization because being a good and virtuous 
person was the primary concern of a junzi; “only through restoring the Way will the social 
rites prosper; only after the rites prevail will the disintegrated society come together again” 
(You 432). Instead of emphasizing fear or governmental might, Confucius elevated li as a 
rhetorical methodology to achieve peace and create junzis. Prioritizing li, however, cannot 
exist without emphasizing a process of ritualization. Confucius rhetorically implemented 
rituals into his teachings because they appealed to an individual’s character and ethical 
system.    
Confucius also frequently used rituals as a way to prescribe moral behavior. For 
example, “Tsze-chang asked Confucius about perfect virtue. Confucius said, “To be able to 
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practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue.” He begged to ask 
what they were, and was told, “Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and 
kindness” (Legge 17.6 320). This five-pronged prescription for virtue perfectly displays the 
connection between a person’s desire to improve their ethical heuristics and a 
methodology that ritualistically applies those ethics for personal improvement; 
“appropriate ritual acts function as heuristics to help an individual grow his good 
personality and guide him to practice what is ethically desirable in the society” (You 434). 
Confucius was able to make such distinct and concrete statements about morality because 
of his position as the ‘master’. Although other Chinese scholars used appeals to morality in 
their texts, the Analects is unique because no other Confucian scholar had the specific 
conditions that allowed Confucius to claim himself the master and face no opposition. Once 
the Warring States period blossomed, multiple schools of thought emerged on the political 
scene and thus, many “prophets” were reduced to arguing in public debates and forums 
because that is how society was progressing. The implications of Confucius’s teaching are 
highly unique and valuable because they represent a position that has long since become 
inaccessible.     
Confucius’s use of dialectical juxtaposition, indirectness and ambiguity, and 
ritualization in the Analects implies that readers should grasp their own potential and 
embrace Confucian principles by applying them to their own methodology. IR’s principles 
of equality and self-determination attempt to eliminate dominance in speech and value 
listening as a way of respecting others’ ideas while, simultaneously, providing a platform 
for the free and open expression of ideas.  
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Mencius: Mencius  
Mencius, coming nearly a hundred years after Confucius, was fascinated by 
Confucius’s teachings and rhetorical style. He built off the influences of Confucius’s 
teachings to craft his own unique form that helped spread Confucianism throughout 
Mainland China. Xing Lu writes, “If Confucius’s place in Chinese history is comparable to 
that of Socrates in the West, the position of Mencius is often likened to that of Plato” (169). 
In a similar way to Plato’s dialogues, Mencius approached matters very objectively in his 
dialogues and typically relied on syllogistic argumentation to explain his points. This was 
done mostly out of necessity, for if Mencius was not clear and concise with his rhetorical 
style, those who he was trying to recruit would most likely follow a different tradition. In 
this section, I will break down the Mencius’s rhetorical style into three different rhetorical 
devices: (1) the dialectical juxtaposition of ideas with an emphasis on bian (argumentation) 
and rationality, (2) the use of metaphor and analogy to achieve ambiguity, and (3) an 
appeal to righteousness invoked by moral speech. Furthermore, I will focus on two of IR’s 
core principles, equality and self-determination, in order to show the similarities between 
them and the Confucian style. 
The Mencius utilizes dialectical juxtaposition in order to appeal to readers through 
rationality and a focus on bian. In the Mencius, Mencius is depicted as constantly traveling 
and spreading the Confucian philosophy through his dialectical encounters with a variety 
of people including scholars, commoners and kings.  As a result, Mencius often adopted the 
role of the ‘advisor’ and made many of his points via rational argumentation that clearly 
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and logically explained himself to the many different types of people he encountered. 
Consider this exchange:  
1. The King said, ‘I wish to quietly receive your instructions.’  
2. Mencius replied, ‘Is there any difference between killing a man with a stick and 
with a sword?’ The King said, ‘There is no difference!’  
3. Is there any difference doing it with a sword and with a style of government?’ 
‘There is no difference’, was the reply.  
4. Mencius then said, ‘In your kitchen there is fat meat; in your stables there are fat 
horses. But your people have the look of hunger, and on the wilds there are those 
who have died of famine. This is leading on beasts to devour men’ (M 1.3 4).     
In this exchange, Mencius established juxtaposition on three separate accounts: the first 
between the sword and the stick as a method of killing, the second between the sword and 
government as a form of killing, and the third between the hungry people of the land and 
the gluttonous lifestyle of the king and his court. These juxtapositions simplify the 
distinction between what is right and wrong to a matter of ‘this’ or ‘that’.  
Mencius’s dialogue with the king uses juxtaposition to set up a dichotomous thought 
experiment on the morality of killing. There is an embedded binary in this example that 
places the difference between killing a man with one’s own hands and killing a man via 
governmental negligence in juxtaposition. The king’s response implies that killing should 
not be subjectively discerned, rather killing can only be what it is: an act of barbarism that 
discerns rabid beasts from rational men. It is a king’s job to clearly see the dividing lines 
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between what is right and what is wrong, what is acceptable and what is not. Knowing that 
the king would reply in such a way, Mencius’s use of juxtaposition revealed his true 
instruction, which was that living in luxury as royalty while one’s people die of hunger is no 
different than systematically slaughtering each citizen one by one. As a result, Mencius 
compared the king and his royal subjects to beasts who devour men.   
Not having the luxury of embodying the role of the ‘master’ like Confucius, Mencius’s 
position as an ‘advisor’ required a careful attention to the way he formulated thoughts. 
Therefore, in order to give the king good advice and not anger him to the point of having 
him executed, Mencius applied rational arguments in his dialogue with the king to clearly 
lay out the path of righteousness in an irrefutable way. Mencius’s rational discourse serves 
twofold: first it, in a syllogistic way, lays out step-by-step why neglecting the hunger of the 
people is morally reprehensible; second, it allows the king to understand, in a non-
threatening manner, that he is disregarding the value of his people by neglecting their 
hunger. This is an appeal to IR’s principle of equality because it allows Mencius to draw a 
distinct line between moral and immoral behavior by highlighting the need for a king to 
value and respect his people’s condition as equal to his own. Knowing that Mencius was 
right, the king could not rightfully execute him and thus, welcomed his council despite his 
bold use of language.  
Foss and Griffin established the principle of equality so that it would apply to all 
types of human relationships. Equality, however, can only be achieved by eliminating the 
elitist and dominant types of speech within those relationships. Mencius, through his use of 
juxtaposition and rational bian, appealed to the principle of equality on behalf of the poor 
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and hungry people. The use of juxtaposition and rational bian, coupled with Mencius’s 
brazen character and belief in righteousness, gives the Mencius an inviting and critically 
discerning rhetorical style. Mencius’s style effectively enabled the king to see both the logic 
behind his poor decision-making as well as the lack of respect he had for the value of his 
people. Furthermore, whereas Confucius’s Analects expressed the principle of equality 
through wise teachings and sayings, the Mencius’s dialectical style expresses it through 
stories that incorporate syllogistic dialogues meant to increase the affective charge on 
readers toward the characters in the story. In other words, Mencius’s style was more 
focused on its appeal to potential followers, whereas Confucius was solely concerned with 
articulating his doctrine. 
 As a second rhetorical device, Mencius frequently used metaphors and analogies in 
order to shroud his message in ambiguity; therein forcing the reader to subjectively 
interpret his meaning. In the previous example, Mencius implied that the king’s lavish 
lifestyle was like training beasts to devour humans; where the beasts represent those who 
indulge in luxury and devour humans by leaving them out to starve. Many times in the 
Mencius, metaphors and analogies are like jigsaw puzzles when it comes to understanding 
meaning. They must be carefully be pieced together so that the bigger picture can come 
into view. Here is an example, “If a man had a finger that was crooked, even if it was neither 
painful nor a handicap in his work, he would travel across the kingdom if he heard of a 
doctor who could straighten it” (Legge 880). Through the use of analogy, Mencius implies 
that man’s obsession with perfection blinds him to the greater importance of ‘things’. He 
continues by drawing the conclusion, “If a man’s finger is not like those of other people, he 
realizes dissatisfaction; but if his mind does not operate like the minds of other people, he 
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does not feel dissatisfied.” In this, Mencius established juxtaposition between the way other 
people think and the way one should think in order to persuade the reader not to be 
distracted by small insignificant things, like a crooked finger.  
The crooked finger analogy implies that the reader should subjectively create a 
worldview that does not rely on others’ opinions to assign value or worth. IR’s principle of 
self-determination wants individuals to trust that others are in control of their own 
thoughts so that they can focus entirely on developing their own opinion. It is a principle 
grounded in trusting others to conduct their thoughts in a responsible manner. In the 
Mencius, obsessing over a crooked finger is like worrying about the concerns of others; one 
can travel the world in search of a doctor or analyze every possibility for what another 
person might be thinking, but it is better to just accept the lack of control and focus one’s 
attention internally. Mencius glorifies the self-determined mind because it has a greater 
perspective on the relative importance of things and operates differently than a xiaoren’s 
mind.     
 Consider this exchange between Mencius and a fellow philosopher: 
1. The Philosopher Kao said, “Man’s nature is like water whirling round in a corner. 
Open a passage for it to the east, and it will flow to the east; open a passage for it 
to the west, and it will flow to the west. Man’s nature is indifferent to good and 
evil, just as the water is indifferent to the east and the west.  
2. Mencius replied, “Water indeed will flow indifferently to the east or west, but 
will it flow indifferently up or down? The tendency of man’s nature to do 'good' 
is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. 
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3. “Now by striking water and causing it to leap up, you may make it go over your 
forehead, and, by damming and leading it you may force it up a hill; but are such 
movements according to the nature of water? When men are made to do what is 
not good, their nature is dealt with in this way” (M 21.1b-3 127).  
This dialogue beautifully portrays Mencius’s rhetorical style at work. Its dialectical 
juxtaposing of the two philosophers’ competing theories on the movement of water implies 
that when a person is forced to do wrong, it is like attempting to build a dam that makes 
water travel uphill. In the end, Mencius is the one who offers a metaphor that exemplifies 
the true nature of water: the natural downward flow of water is man’s natural tendency to 
do ‘good’. The water metaphor provides an interesting commentary on human nature, one 
that is rooted in a fundamental appreciation for the human race. Mencius astutely points 
out to the philosopher Kao that water only flows east and west because it is already being 
prevented from flowing in its true direction, downward. Whether it be a dam, a waterway 
construction, or even the earth itself, something must stand in the way of water to prevent 
it from flowing downward. Mencius used this metaphor to indirectly address the 
unadulterated nature of humanity.  
Mencius’s underlying message in the above analogy is that doing ‘good’ is the purest 
natural instinct of humans. One of IR’s basic assumptions is that individuals should view 
communication exchanges as existing within an “environment where growth and change 
can occur, but where changing others is neither the ultimate goal nor the criterion for 
success in the interaction…when rhetors use invitational rhetoric their goal is to enter into 
a dialogue in order to share perspectives and positions, to see the complexity of an issue 
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about which neither party agrees, and to increases understanding.” (J.E. Bone et al. 436). 
Essentially, IR seeks to improve the state of human communication. They continue, “The 
interaction, or relationship between those involved in the exchange, is rooted in reciprocity 
and respect.”  
Lozano-Reich and Cloud point out that Bone, Griffin, and Scholz “extend theorizing 
on invitational rhetoric by articulating a link between invitational rhetoric and civility. 
Hence, they contend invitational rhetoric, as a civilizing strategy, is a means to create 
ethical exchanges in difficult situations” (Lozano-Reich & Cloud 220). In a sense, the principle 
function of IR is to create ‘good’ and ethical interpersonal relationships. What is ‘good’, 
however, is not a simple prescription. Much like the case with IR, the definition of ‘good’ in 
the Mencius cannot be summed up in one clean sentence; rather, it is the culmination of all 
the different ways that ren manifests and how it is applied (li).  
The water metaphor in the preceding example is representative of what is ‘good’: it 
may be amorphous and travel freely in any direction, but it only has one true way. Water 
was Mencius’s way of ambiguously endorsing the entire Confucian system and all its 
principles. It eludes that the Confucian system is rooted in a fundamental appreciation for 
every individual and the potential they hold. This also holds true for Foss and Griffin’s IR. 
Furthermore, it provides readers with the confidence needed to develop their own 
Confucian heuristics without relying on the influence of others.  
 The last rhetorical device in the Mencius is an appeal to righteousness through 
moral speech. One of the major areas where the Mencius differs from the Analects is its 
emphasis on li and one’s ability to achieve the highest virtue. Whereas Confucius was said 
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to be a humble man who mainly focused on the refinement of ren, Mencius was noted for 
his courageous and virtuous personality that was always concerned with righteousness 
and the elevation of ren. This divide is further enunciated by the political context in which 
each man lived. In one translation Mencius says, “I want to rectify the human hearts, 
eliminate heresies, oppose extreme actions, and put down biased views” (M 3b.9 141-142). In 
a different translation Mencius says, “A gentleman (junzi) should never give up practicing 
righteousness, whether he is successful or is destitute” (M 7a.9 305). Mencius’s focus on 
righteousness guided his rhetorical style via appeals to morality and sincerity. The drive to 
attain righteousness invariably leads Confucian scholars to respect and value the opinions 
and thoughts of others because a true junzi is concerned with maintaining positive and 
benevolent human relationships.   
Some of Mencius’s most apparent examples of moral speech are embedded in his 
discussions on human nature. For Mencius, evil is a human characteristic that does not 
exist objectively in the natural world and can only grow if a person stops cultivating their 
natural goodness (ren). Mencius wrote, “given the right nourishment there is nothing that 
will not grow, and deprived of it there is nothing that will not wither away” (Lau 6a.8.165). 
The meaning behind this is that no man is innately evil; rather, they have merely neglected 
their cultivation of ren. For Mencius, humans are capable of rectifying themselves and 
choosing the moral path as an act of will (Lu 172). Mencius believed that humans require the 
ability to take agency in their own lives as an act of self-determination. I argue that 
Mencius’s appeal to righteousness is actually an endorsement of IR’s principle of self-
determination because it goads readers into searching for a self-determined righteousness 
crafted by proper ren and li. 
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In order to walk a moral and righteousness path, Mencius emphasized the power 
of and need for taking agent-oriented action. His rhetorical strategy was to center all of 
speech on the cultivation of ren and to practice morally ‘good’ acts. IR offers the principle of 
self-determination as a way to take complete and unimpeded action on one’s own thoughts 
in order to improve the quality of ethical exchanges in human relationships. Mencius said, 
“He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature, is called a robber; he who outrages 
righteousness, is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow” (M 4.3b 21). In 
this quote, ren and li are comparable to the images of the robber and the ruffian (with the 
‘mere fellow’ indirectly eluding to the xiaoren). These characters have reprehensible 
natures and are not on the path of higher morality; thus, a Confucian follower should take 
the examples of the robber and ruffian as a lesson in li that motivates one to move away 
from the xiaoren and toward the junzi to achieve righteousness. It only becomes possible 
for an individual to move away from the path of the robber and ruffian, however, if they 
take action and learn from Mencius’s example.  
Mencius’s purpose for creating the distinction between a xiaoren and a junzi was 
to emphasize that a base person is the foundation from which all people begin. In order to 
improve one’s status as a person, he or she must constantly refine, practice, and apply their 
ren. In this way, self-determination becomes a prerequisite for a junzi because the status of 
‘junzi’ can only be reached if one takes hold of their agency. Through action, one can control 
the way they live their life and actively apply a ritualized lifestyle that cultivates ren and 
improves ethical exchanges within human relationships.  
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Mencius offers another interesting example of how one should view 
righteousness: “Chess Ch’iu is the best chess-player in all the kingdom. Suppose that he is 
teaching two men to play. The one gives to the subject his whole mind and bends to it all 
his will, doing nothing but listening to Chess Ch’iu. The other, although he seems to be 
listening, has his whole mind running on a swan which he thinks is approaching, and 
wishes to bend his bow, adjust the string to the arrow, and shoot it.” In this passage, 
Mencius uses chess as a vehicle to discuss the nature of cultivating ren and following a 
righteous path. He continues, “Although he is learning along with the other, (Chess Ch’iu) 
does not come up to him. Why? Because his intelligence is not equal? Not so.” (M 22.2a 134) 
Mencius ends his chess example with a rhetorical question in order to imply that although 
both students are of equal intelligence, one is considered more valuable than the other.  
In Mencius’s above example, he implies that both students are of equal ability, but 
the first is more valuable as a student because he shows a constant determination and 
unrelenting focus on mastering the game. The second student is just as talented, but lacks 
the proper mental discipline to be Chess Ch’iu’s apprentice. The first student serves as a 
metaphor for a junzi, while the second student represents a xiaoren. If the game of chess 
functions as a metaphor for cultivating ren, then the one who abides by IR’s principle of 
self-determination is considered the better student. By actively tuning out exterior 
influences (i.e. archery or the swan outside the window), a student can fully attend to his 
improvement in chess and can walk the path toward becoming a junzi.     
Mencius faced a natural resistance from the people he would teach because of the 
availability of differing and competing traditions, thus he could not simply dictate moral 
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and righteous behavior like Confucius; rather, he had to express it in appealing ways that 
emphasized agent-oriented action. Here is an example of Mencius’s desire for complete 
devotion to righteousness, “Mencius said: I like fish, and I also like bear’s paws. If I cannot 
have the two together, I will let the fish go, and take the bear’s paws. So, I like life, and I also 
like righteousness. If I cannot keep the two together, I will let life go, and choose 
righteousness” (M 22.1b 134). This example displays Mencius’s logical and rational style by 
placing the bear’s paws and righteousness juxtaposition to one another in order to make 
value-claims about both righteousness and life. Mencius implies that if you desire to attain 
righteousness, you must have complete devotion to it, even above your own life. IR’s 
principle of self-determination is characterized by complete devotion to a present task or 
goal and is a prerequisite for developing ethical ways to communicate. IR’s strives to 
eliminate oppression and patriarchal domination in communication in a way that 
prescribes following a righteous path (where the invitational style is the path of 
righteousness).    
The many stylistic similarities in both the Mencius and Confucius’s Analects create a 
harmonic understanding of these Confucian scholars’ rhetorical style. Likewise, the 
differences in rhetorical forms between the two highlights the unique context of each man’s 
historical positioning and elude to the existence of a increasingly complex and broader 
ancient Chinese rhetorical tradition. The harmony between the two texts readily displays 
the resonance between them and IR’s principles of equality and self-determination. The use 
of dialectical juxtaposition, syllogistic argumentation, metaphors and analogies, and 
ritualization and righteousness as persuasive tactics are all meant to force readers to focus 
their attention internally and evolve through osmosis into a self-discerning and inventive 
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subject. In contemporary rhetorical theory, the Mencius and the Analects’ rhetorical style 
would best fit into Foss and Griffin’s invitational model, which values the principles of 
equality and self-determination.  
Conclusion 
Looking at ancient texts such as the Analects and the Mencius alongside 
contemporary invitational rhetoric serves a twofold purpose: (1) it bridges a gap between 
current texts available through a traditional Greco-Roman archive and the lesser known 
and near inaccessible traditions of ancient cultures; (2) it offers productive rhetorical 
insight without focusing on traditional/masculine concepts such as antagonism, forceful 
persuasion and syllogistic argumentation. The resonance occurring between the two 
traditions catalyzes the evolution of contemporary rhetorical knowledge to focus more 
generally on “traditions”, instead of a single tradition rooted in a set of core traditional 
values.  
Confucius and Mencius’s stylistically resembled each other through their use of 
indirectness, the dialectical juxtaposition of ideas, and implementing metaphors and 
analogies as a means to persuade. They, however, displayed their style through unique and 
different rhetorical forms, of which the culprit in many cases was the unique political 
setting each man experienced. Confucius tended to instruct his disciples from a ‘master’ 
position and therefore, the rhetorical strategies he used paralleled the master-student 
dichotomy. Confucius’s constant ritualizing of his student’s lives and habits is evidence of 
his unique rhetorical form. In his dialogues, Confucius provides philosophical insights that 
can be misconstrued as being scolding or reprimanding. Consequently, this often leaves his 
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students feeling low or insufficient, which is exactly what Confucius hoped for so that they 
would want to ritualize their lives to fit the mold of a junzi. Mencius, on the other hand, is 
usually depicted in his dialogues as being a council or advisor to someone in a higher 
position than him. Therefore, the ‘master’ voice of Confucius gets replaced with the 
‘advisor,’ which tends to focus on anecdotal and analytical modes of persuasion. Mencius 
combined rational argumentation with colorful stories to speak on the nature of ren and 
righteousness. Both men displayed similar styles of persuasion through dialectics and 
indirectness, but because of the way they lived their lives, their rhetorical forms are 
considerably different. 
By simply diving into the inner workings of texts such as the Analects and the 
Mencius, scholars of rhetoric gain insight on concepts that are frequently overlooked, but 
share common values with the contemporary works that are trying to de-center traditional 
notions of rhetoric. Furthermore, the commonalities between the two texts suggest that 
they build on a larger and more developed Chinese rhetorical tradition composed of other 
Chinese schools of thought, which in turn offer their own rhetorical insights. Foss and 
Griffin’s concepts of equality and self-determination illuminate the rhetorical vision of 
Confucianism’s style and value system, while simultaneously providing validation for IR’s 
move to de-center the Platonic/Aristotelian notion of rhetoric as antagonistic 
argumentation and persuasion. 
The next chapter will build on the harmonic resonance between Confucius and 
Mencius to show that more connections exist between the different ancient Chinese 
traditions. Namely, chapter 2 moves into ancient Daoism and the works of its two major 
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scholars: Laozi and Chuang Tzu. From the works of these two men, Foss and Griffin’s 
concepts will again show the resonance occurring between contemporary rhetorical 
scholarship and ancient Chinese rhetorical traditions. 
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Chapter 2: Daoism 
Daoism, unlike Confucianism, is not a structured system that educates via a core 
curriculum. It rather revolves around the compiled writings and conversations of two 
specific philosophers: Laozi and Chuang Tzu. While Laozi used mystic language and 
paradoxical speech to emphasize wu-wei (non-action), Chuang Tzu used satirical, 
nonsensical and sometimes humorous anecdotes to display his notion of dao (Lu 240). These 
two scholars used colorful narratives and perplexing paradoxes to guide their reader 
toward understanding the dao. Whereas Confucian scholars attempted to construct 
systems of legitimacy meant to improve efficiency and reduce ambiguity in communication, 
Daoist scholars worked to unravel paradoxes and offer language-games that deconstruct 
one’s idea of what ‘the way’ means. The disjointedness between Laozi and Chuang Tzu’s 
way of thinking contributes to Daoism’s paradoxical nature. Although Daoism is 
diametrically opposed to Confucianism, they both embrace invitational concepts through a 
style that invites audiences to come to their own conclusions about anecdotes, paradoxes, 
historical reconstructions and questions of philosophy and morality. 
The Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu, like the Analects and the Mencius, were originally 
written in classical Chinese characters, making the original primary texts impossible to 
decipher unless one is fully versed in the classical Chinese written system. Therefore, the 
primary documents for this chapter are direct translations of those ancient Chinese texts. 
In this chapter, I use the translations of Burton Watson, Chad Hansen, and D.C. Lau for both 
the Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu. Although translations make it difficult to know whether 
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or not the voice in the translation is the same as the actual voice of the historical figure, it is 
still valuable to consider the topological significance of each translation.    
Having translations for texts that are already shrouded in mystery enhances the 
various meanings behind each different translation. Unlike Confucian scholars who wrote 
in dialogues and relied heavily on dialectical strategies, the many different anecdotes and 
paradoxes of Daoist scholars function as platforms for readers to dive deeper into the 
meaning they create for themselves. Each of the translations in this chapter represents a 
unique perspective coming from an individual that has already interpreted what the text 
has to offer and is translating it in his or her own way. Having the translations of Watson, 
Hansen, and Lau will provide a broader perspective for readers to access the many 
different ways both the Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu can be read.   
This chapter provides a brief orientation to the historical context of ancient Daoism 
and its major philosophical tenets. My purpose in this analysis is first, to identify the 
stylistic similarities present in the Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu and then to look at how 
they compare with Foss and Griffin’s IR principles of equality and immanent value. Finally, 
I conclude with a summary of the two scholar’s stylistic differences and how they resonate 
with contemporary invitational principles of equality and immanent value.  
Historical Context 
 Daoism, as a term, may refer to the entire ancient Chinese school of thought, but in 
truth it is composed of two men’s works. Chronologically, Laozi, being a contemporary of 
Confucius, came before Chuang Tzu (a contemporary of Mencius) and is thus considered to 
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be the founder of Daoism. Whereas the goal for Confucian followers was to improve upon 
and apply their ren in order to become junzis, Daoists were focused on attaining sage-hood 
by freeing themselves from attachments to social constructs and developing their own 
understanding of how to appreciate and follow dao. As a result, neither Laozi nor Chuang 
Tzu endorsed any specific method for improving oneself. Because Daoism has “dao” in its 
appellation, it often gets misconstrued as being the first and foremost place to find thinkers 
who were intent on aligning their actions with the dao. This, however, is incorrect 
considering that both Confucius and Mencius constantly referenced the dao in their 
teachings. Since Confucianism chronologically preceded Daoism, whenever Laozi and 
Chuang Tzu referred to the dao they were doing so in reference to a preceding 
understanding of what dao meant among the differing schools of thought in ancient China.    
There is altogether very little known about Laozi and his true nature. Many texts 
describe Laozi as a legendary figure that could be referring to a variety of different 
influential figures around 500 BCE, similar to King Arthur in Western folklore. One account 
describes Laozi as an archivist named Li Er (also known as Lao Dan) who was from the 
state of Chu and worked for the Eastern Zhou dynasty. According to the legend, after living 
in Zhou for many years and witnessing the dynasty’s decline, Laozi became disillusioned 
with society and politics and wrote the Daodejing upon request from a Zhou official before 
leaving and becoming a hermit (Si-Ma 314). 
 While this depiction of Laozi’s existence is not necessarily false, its accuracy is 
doubtful. According to Hansen, “the traditional biographical information about Laozi is 
largely either fanciful (he lived to be 160 to 200 years old), historically dubious (he taught 
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Confucius), or contradictory (his hometown, official posts, age)” (Hansen 210). In all 
likelihood, there were probably a variety of contributors to the Daodejing that were all 
lumped under the name ‘Laozi’. One thing that can be said with certainty, however, is that 
there is a difference between Laozi the man, and Laozi the book. Many believe the two 
existed in different time periods. The Laozi, or Daodejing, was most likely written in its 
entirety after Laozi himself existed because the text consistently refers to namelessness 
(which implies naming has already been discovered) and thus cannot have been composed 
before or contemporary to that of Confucius (Fung 94). Therefore, it is more than likely the 
case that most of Laozi’s Daodejing has no actual connection to Laozi the historical 
individual. 
 Chuan Chou, better known as Chuang Tzu (also Zhuangzi), was the second major 
Daoist scholar who lived around approximately 369-286 BCE (Fung 104). Lu describes 
Chuang Tzu as having witnessed “social chaos and moral decline resulting from the endless 
wars and pursuit of political power characteristic of the Warring States period. He also 
lived in a climate of vigorous philosophical debates over issues of morality, politics, and 
epistemology” (Lu 238). Chuang Tzu may not be as mythic or legendary as Laozi, but much of 
his personal life is still shrouded in mystery. What little is known about him is adapted 
from his writings, which ironically are said to amount to over a hundred thousand words. 
 Similar to Laozi’s writings, the Chuang Tzu as a text is most likely a compilation of 
works by Chuang Tzu’s students and followers. The book itself is, “a collection of various 
Daoist writings, some of which represent Daoism in its first phase of development, some in 
its second and some in its third” (Fung 104). Considering Chuang Tzu came only at the end of 
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Daoism’s growth, the Chuang Tzu’s systematic development could only come to fruition 
through the expansions made by Chuang Tzu’s followers. Therefore, much like the 
Daodejing, Chuang Tzu’s contribution to Daoism must be attributed to the work Chuang Tzu 
and not necessarily to the historical figure. 
Chuang Tzu characteristically despised any form of politics or social constructions 
because it limited a person’s true freedom. One famous fable about Chuang Tzu depicts him 
responding to the King of Chu’s messenger after having been asked to be the minister of the 
state: “I have heard that there is a sacred tortoise in Chu that has been dead for three 
thousand years. The king keeps it wrapped in cloth and boxed, and stores it in the ancestral 
temple. Now would this tortoise rather be dead and have its bones left behind and 
honored? Or would it rather be alive and dragging its tail in the mud?” Chuang Tzu ended 
his metaphor by telling the king’s official that he would rather drag his tail in the mud than 
work for the king (Watson 17.187-88). Chuang Tzu, like Laozi, lived a life outside of society, 
but unlike Laozi he was not a hermit, but a traveler who immersed himself in nature. He 
enjoyed the prospect of sitting by a river stream at the base of a mountain or in the middle 
of a forest to find inspiration. For example, the first chapter of the Chuang Tzu is titled “Free 
and Easy Wandering”, which reflects his unshackled and free roaming historical 
personality. 
It was Chuang Tzu’s prerogative to describe the indescribable, to take Laozi’s 
concepts of mysticism and contradictions and further shroud them in obscurity by placing 
them in fantastical narratives. Seeing as how Chuang Tzu was a traveler and faced the same 
political climate as Mencius, his narrative style is most likely a means of appealing listeners 
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who had been exposed to many competing thoughts. Typically, Chuang Tzu’s philosophical 
dialogues left out a conclusion in place of a double rhetorical question, “Then is there really 
an X? Or is there no X?” (Hansen 266) This type of question provokes the reader to come up 
with their own conclusion, thus embracing their own subjectivity and freeing themselves 
conceptually from the constraints of socially constructed ways of thinking. Chuang Tzu’s 
style was unique among all of Chinese philosophy for its use of philosophical fantasies. 
Hansen writes, “This style injects insecurity into interpreters. Yet it attracts us like 
philosophical honey. His combination of brilliance and elusive statements frustrates, 
delights, and challenges those who want to interpret him” (Hansen 265). His stories (many of 
which, for example, involve thieves, craftsmen, monsters, animals and Confucians or 
converted Confucians) provide a set of premises for the reader to get behind, but then 
quickly abandon that position and leave the reader wondering whether Daoism is a 
platform for enlightenment, or a target for ridicule. Both Chuang Tzu and Laozi resisted the 
Confucian influences of their time by stylistically confusing their followers, therein forcing 
them to invent pure ideas that were not tainted by rigid systems of thought.       
Philosophical Overview 
Daoism’s conceptualization of the universe is best expressed as, “the notion of dao 
(the way), approached through de (virtue) and manifested in wu-wei (non action)” (Lu 229). 
Unlike Confucius who emphasized an individual’s active cultivation of ren, Daoist scholars 
encouraged individuals to follow the dao through a lifestyle of wu-wei, or action through in-
action. Daoists regarded such efforts to cultivate ren as the root cause of moral decay and 
social disorder. Laozi, for example, argued that the principles of benevolence and rectitude 
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should be abandoned, since the more people talked about such principles, the more 
corruption and hypocrisy would emerge.  Laozi writes in the Daodejing, “The better known 
the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers there are” (Lau 58.84-5). By imposing a 
method of non-action, Chuang Tzu believed humans would act in accordance with the 
natural development of things (or simply the dao) and thus could not be constrained by the 
artificiality of social constructs.    
Though each text’s rhetorical style differed, they both emphasized following the 
Way through a method of non-action, or wu-wei. Kincaid writes, “When someone advises a 
young man or woman to act naturally and quit trying so hard to win someone’s affections, 
they are advocating wu-wei, the principle of non-action” (Kincaid 337). Another example of 
non-action is meditation; a process of allowing one’s thoughts to roam in and out of the 
mind unimpeded, as if a large gate has been opened allowing water to flow freely in all 
directions. This is not acting on one’s desire to think or to not think. Wu-wei is a process of 
stillness that allows the actions of the exterior world to pass by without interruption. 
 Laozi and Chuang Tzu’s writings each depicted wu-wei differently, but they were 
always in relation to the dao. Laozi did not condone, for example, the use of excessive or 
elegant speech because it went against the principle of wu-wei. He said, “truthful words are 
not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. Good words are not persuasive; persuasive 
words are not good. He who knows has no wide learning; he who has wide learning does 
not know” (Lau 81.117). Chuang Tzu shared a similar skepticism of language, but he was 
more focused on the relationship between language and meaning. In his own words, “Men 
of the world who value the Way all turn to books. But books are nothing more than words. 
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Words have value; what is of value in words is meaning. Meaning has something it is 
pursuing, but the thing that is pursuing cannot be put into words” (Watson 13.152). In a sense, 
both men recognize that the true nature of dao is something that cannot be described 
through constructs (i.e. language); the dao simply is. ‘Dao’ is nothing more than a filler 
word used to help identify what is void of meaning. The label itself provides no real 
definition for what dao is, other than serving as a beacon to identify the existence of 
something that cannot be identified. 
Both Laozi and Chuang Tzu’s texts came after the influence of Confucianism and 
thus, could not have been conceptualized without Confucianism serving as a point of 
resistance. As a result, the Daoist understanding of dao is more like an answer to a 
question. It is an attempt to transcend Confucianism’s ming bian. Laozi writes in Chapter 1 
of the Daodejing, “Ways can be guided; they are not fixed ways. Names can be named; they 
are not fixed names. ‘Absence’ names the cosmic horizon, ‘presence’ names the mother of 
10,000 natural kinds…Conceiving of them as being one, call that ‘fathomless’. Calling it 
‘fathomless’ is still not to fathom it” (Hansen 38).  Or in Chapter 32: “Ways fix on a nameless 
uncarved block. Although small, none in the social world can make it serve. As you start to 
institutionalize, there are names. As soon as there are names, generally, you really should 
know to stop” (Hansen 103). Both of these chapters attempt to describe something that is 
indescribable for the purpose of showing the reader that dao actually is indescribable.  
In Chapter 32, Laozi uses the depiction of a smooth uncarved rock to represent the 
dao. As soon as language intervenes, it is like carving one line onto the uncarved block. 
Once carved, the block can never again go back to its natural uncarved state. Any attempt to 
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describe what both Daoist scholars refer to as the ‘Eternal Dao’ is simply an appellation of 
the concept being described. The Eternal Dao “is unnamable; at the same time it is that 
which all namables come to be” (Fung 95).     
Chuang Tzu depicted the dao in a similar fashion, but his style was more skeptical of 
language altogether. He saw that the world as limited by the names it used to identify 
things and was in desperate need of a way to look beyond the names (in particularly the 
naming of the Confucian system as well as the systems contemporary to him). Chuang Tzu 
believed that actively separating the name of a thing from the thing itself was a form of 
elevating one’s mind, thereby freeing the object from its attachment to its name as well as 
freeing Chuang Tzu from his attachment to the object’s name. By identifying names, Chuang 
Tzu could see the world as it really was and could achieve happiness. Chuang Tzu believed 
a sage was a person who was perfectly happy “because he transcends the ordinary 
distinction between the self and the world…He is one with the Dao…The Dao is nameless 
and so the sage who is one with the Dao is also nameless” (Fung 110). Chuang Tzu saw 
perfection and happiness as two different expressions of the same thing. Consequently the 
attainment of perfect virtue is a key component in Daoism’s philosophy and as a result, dao 
is rarely referenced without being in relation to de (virtue).  
Laozi wrote the Daodejing to emphasize the mutual connection between dao and de. 
For him, “while dao refers to the invisible, untouchable, and unspeakable law of nature, de 
refers to the fulfillment of the dao through wise speech and proper action” (Lu 230). The 
relationship between dao and de is reminiscent of the relationship between the Confucian 
concepts ren and li, but instead of de serving as a rhetorical vehicle for dao as li does for 
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ren, the relationship is much less constricted. Laozi writes, “A man of the highest virtue 
does not keep to virtue and that is why he has virtue” (Lau 38.57). For Laozi, virtue was 
something that could only be self-discovered. Attempting to diligently follow a prescribed 
virtue would be what Laozi called ‘acting on constructs’ and not in accordance with dao and 
wu-wei. 
 Chuang Tzu had a similar outlook on de that freed readers from the constraints of 
what virtue should look like. Chuang Tzu perceived human limitations as inescapable 
because of their attachment to language and symbols. Thus, one should strive to achieve de 
by looking beyond the constraints of language. It was his belief that a virtuous man “rests 
without thought, moves without plan. He has no use for right and wrong, beautiful and 
ugly” (Lau 12.137). Chuang Tzu was not so much worried about moral and ethical constraints, 
because they are similarly constrained by symbols and language. A truly virtuous man, or a 
zhen ren, is one who lives and exists within the constructed world, but whose mind is in a 
state of nonattachment. It is a free-mindedness that “deconstructs one’s previous 
conceptual framework, creating a new way of seeing the world and living one’s life in its 
place” (Lu 243). Chuang Tzu’s narrative style of deconstructing names works together with 
Laozi’s mystic path of self-discovery to illuminate dao and de’s co-dependent relationship. 
Laozi: Daodejing  
The Daodejing is divided into two sections: the Dao Jing (ch. 1-37) and the De Jing 
(ch. 38-81). Whereas dao refers to the invisible, untouchable, and unspeakable laws of 
nature (more simply defined as the “way”), de refers to the fulfillment of the dao through 
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wise speech and proper action (virtue or virtuosity) (Lu 230). Consequently, the first section 
deals with issues of subjectivity, paradoxical relations and the overall nature of the dao and 
the second section deals with the political and proper enactment of governance. In the 
Daodejing there are three major rhetorical devices in use: (1) a strategy of reversal that 
gives negative meaning to positive words and phrases and vice versa; (2) the use of 
paradoxical words and phrases; (3) the use of wu ming (namelessness). Each of these 
devices shares a resonating relationship with the IR principles of equality and immanent 
value. 
The Daodejing frequently uses a strategy of reversal to flip the reader’s thought 
process in order to display the continuously transitioning and oppositional nature of the 
universe. Laozi takes positive attributes and places them on negative things to emphasize 
that nothing in the dao exists in an extreme. It says in Chapter 71 Paradox and Practicality, 
“Knowing not to know is recommended. Not knowing to know is a defect. In general, simply 
deem defects to be defects. Then, one can be non-defective. Sages are not defective when 
they deem defects ‘defects’” (H 183). This chapter gets at the heart of reversal language. 
Namely, a sage’s mind must be in a constant flux between giving up “that” and taking “this”. 
Upon acquiring “this” it immediately becomes “that” and thus must again be traded for 
“this”.  
The relative importance of “this” or “that” shows the reader that nothing that is 
completely right or completely wrong; if it was, it would not be in accordance with the dao. 
In this chapter, “taking up this” is a way of refreshing one’s mind in order to cleanse it of all 
the influences it has been exposed to since it was last refreshed. Foss and Griffin’s IR 
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established the principle of equality to eliminate dominating and oppressive influences 
within conversation. It is an attempt to equalize all members in a conversation so that they 
view each other in a nonthreatening and safe way. By creating equality, one can view a 
situation, environment, or conversation objectively and not worry about influences outside 
of one’s own thought process. For Laozi, the process of discarding “that” for “this” is his 
way of consistently equalizing the reader’s mind. The only true virtuosity in the Daodejing 
is one that is focused on the ‘this’, on what is new and free of oppression or influence, on 
the here and the now.  
In Chapter 71, Laozi reverses the reader’s conception of what is considered 
defective with what is non-defective. He ensnares readers in his game of reversals and 
drives them into a state of aporia that discards their mind as a “that” so that the new 
confused mind becomes the refreshed “this”. Laozi takes away the dominating influence of 
the social world by stripping it of its labels to bring readers into a world free of social 
constructions and oppressive influences. Laozi’s strategy of reversal points to the need for 
opposites to work together so that they do not inadvertently introduce exterior influences. 
Laozi beautifully uses a strategy of reversal in chapter 20 Unlearning Learning:  
‘Masterly’ and ‘clumsy’, how much mutually separates them? The human crowd all 
have a surplus, yet I alone seem at a loss. Mine is indeed the mind of a stupid human. 
Ordinary humans are lustrous; I alone am dull. Ordinary humans are critically 
discerning; I alone am obfuscate…I alone am different from other humans (H 20.78). 
In this chapter, Laozi reverses the reader’s conception of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Attributes such 
as “critically discerning” and “lustrous” that are normally considered positive are being 
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expressed as negative attributes. This type of reversal is an attempt to show that two 
opposites (i.e.: lustrous-dull, masterly-clumsy) have such a small degree of separation that 
they should be thought of on similar terms. At the same time, Laozi recognizes his own 
position as being contradictory; by simply speaking as a ‘master’, Laozi places a certain 
amount of authoritative influence on readers. This is a characteristic that was seen in 
Confucius’s Analects, but instead of embodying the role, Laozi circumvents the 
contradiction by showing that he himself is a dull and ordinary human who is often at a 
loss. He applies the principle of equality by taking away the oppressive influence from his 
role as the master. For the Daoist sage, one’s true value is in their ability to strive to be 
unique and self-discovering, which is an attribute that Foss and Griffin likewise endorse. In 
this chapter, Laozi grants individuals the privilege to say, “I alone am…” Knowing this, a 
sage uses reversal as a rhetorical methodology to see beyond the limitations of dualistic 
thinking and embrace a uniquely subjective perspective that equally values other people 
and their ideas. Laozi’s strategy of reversal catalyzes a sage’s path toward self-discovery in 
the Daodejing.  
As a second rhetorical device, Laozi uses paradoxical thought formations in the 
Daodejing to highlight the non-dichotomous nature of the dao. In a way that resonates with 
Foss and Griffin, Laozi desires to be inclusive and inviting of all possibilities. Oppositional 
and binary thoughts only serve to limit the potential of a subject’s free will. An inclusive 
way of thinking eliminates the possibility of contradictions and paradoxes because there is 
never an either/or choice scenario involved. Laozi stresses that perfection is subjective and 
represents those who do not seek it. Therefore, he uses paradoxes to provoke readers who 
believe perfection is attainable or who think in terms of binaries. Laozi writes, “Great 
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perfection seems chipped; Great fullness seems empty; Great straightness seems bent; 
Great skill seems awkward; Great eloquence seems tongue-tied” (Lau 45.67). All of these 
terms play on an audience’s mode of thinking and fundamentally challenge the 
assumptions that hold up social structures like morality and ethics. From these paradoxes, 
a creative tension arises in the reader that breaks down conventional linguistic and 
rhetorical categories and thrusts them directly into the dao. As a result, the typical 
rhetorical strategy of situating dialectics as the counterpart of rhetoric gets sidelined for a 
version of dialectics based on a “profound understanding of the reality of change and 
changelessness that goes beyond mere logical categories” (Lu 237).    
Laozi’s biggest obstacle in the Daodejing is being able to guide readers into a mind 
frame that looks beyond dualistic thinking. Foss and Griffin define the principle of 
immanent value as a way of recognizing that “every being is a unique and necessary part of 
the pattern of the universe and thus has value” (Foss & Griffin 4). They focus on creating 
communication that is always aware of each contributor’s immanent value so that one can 
avoid moments of oppression and unnecessary influence. Instead of thinking in 
oppositional terms that reduce others to their contributions, IR looks for the singular agent, 
the immanent value, of every living being. For Laozi, finding the value of things that have 
socially been deemed unfit, ugly or insufficient is not easy for the average person. 
Therefore, in order to express the notion of singularity and value in the Daodejing, Laozi 
utilizes paradoxical metaphors, analogies and narratives to express the Daoist 
interpretation of the universe as being inclusive instead of oppositional.  
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It says in Chapter 42 Dao, Numbers, Reality and Teaching “Ways generate ‘one’. ‘One’ 
generates ‘two’. ‘Two’ generates ‘three’. ‘Three generates 10,000 natural kinds. 10,000 
natural kinds endure yin and embrace yang” (H 125.42). In this chapter, Laozi shows how all 
‘ways’ generate 10,000 natural kinds (10,000 is a common number used in the Daodejing to 
symbolize a grouping together of all things) and that all things share a mutually inclusive 
relationship with both yin and yang. The two are balanced opposites in that they are always 
considered to be one entity: the yin-yang. The yin-yang symbol is often thought of as a 
dualistic construction that represents a balancing of two opposing forces, but a more 
complete and inclusive understanding of the yin-yang sees it as a singular entity with an 
immanent value that is a balanced existence of two forces, which absent the other become 
incomplete. The paradoxes found within the Daodejing are inclusive in that the only way to 
fully understand them is to recognize the immanent value in both opposing perspectives 
and consider them both simultaneously possible. Just as the yin-yang represents two 
opposing forces combined into a greater whole, Laozi’s paradoxes make the reader aware 
of the immanent value in both sides of whatever metaphor or analogy he has given in order 
to bring the reader into an accepting and inclusive mindset that sees the immanent value of 
all possibilities.  
 In Chapter 41 Laughing at Dao it says, “The greatest purity is like filth. Expansive 
virtuosity seems insufficient. Creating virtuosity is like stealing. Solid authenticity is like 
sliminess. The greatest square has no corners. The greatest artifact is never formed. The 
greatest note rarely sounds. The greatest sign lacks a shape. Ways hide the absence of 
names” (H 41.122). Laozi epitomized the negative and weak as perfect or boundless while 
things that were strong and positive he tended to restrict. A parallel can be drawn here 
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between Laozi’s desire to resist what is high and embrace what is low with Confucius’s 
overarching pursuit of what is virtuous and righteous. The rhetorical style of reversals in 
the Daodejing offer a glimpse at the ways that Daoism sought to differentiate itself from 
Confucian doctrine while simultaneously appearing unique and not somehow in relation to 
Confucianism. In this chapter, Laozi uses a reversal to highlight the underappreciated so 
that the negative aspects of humanity become the reader’s idealized focal point and 
establish an antithetical balancing act where language becomes a pun of itself.  
Laozi paradoxically implies in chapter 41 that the highest form of purity is actually 
filth and that one must steal in order to achieve the greatest virtue. The use of nonsensical 
language in this chapter functions as a way to reprogram the reader’s mind so that he or 
she becomes more aware of the negative and lowly things in life that most would overlook. 
Characteristics such as sliminess and actions such as stealing are not thought of as valuable 
because they are lacking in something (i.e. morality, usefulness etc.). Foss and Griffin, 
however, would characterize a dismissal of these attributes as oppressive and without 
proper consideration of the principle of immanent value. There is a resonance occurring 
between this IR principle and Laozi’s paradoxical focus on the low and useless. Both seek to 
achieve a certain open-mindedness in readers that breaks free of modes of thinking that 
limit the human mind. 
The use of paradoxes in the Daodejing creates balance and equality between positive 
and negative attributes so that readers will learn to be inclusive and appreciative of the 
positive and the negative. Laozi says in Chapter 41 Laughing at Dao, that “the greatest note 
rarely sounds (and) creating virtuosity is like stealing” in order to bring out the immanent 
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value of things that are rarely noticed or underappreciated.  The Daodejing resonates with 
IR’s principle of immanent value through its insertion of metaphorical and anecdotal 
paradoxes. It teaches readers to value what they rarely get a chance to and to be accepting 
instead of oppositional.   
In the Daodejing, the role of choice is essential because it shows readers that they 
are the ones who choose to place no value in filthy, ordinary or dull things. They are 
choosing to only appreciate the lustrous and beautiful things. It is Laozi’s prerogative to 
take away readers’ preconceptions of what is valuable and what is not in favor of adopting 
a more singular and inclusive perspective. In Laozi’s words, “Something and Nothing 
produce each other; The difficult and the easy complement each other; The long and the 
short off-set each other; The high and the low incline towards each other; Note and sound 
harmonize with each other; Before and after follow each other” (Lau 2.5). These paradoxes 
force the reader to unite opposites by situating them as inclusive and non-problematic. For 
a person to form a smooth flowing and organic thought process, they must recognize and 
appreciate the immanent value of every thought and idea in order to eliminate the mental 
speed bumps of thinking in terms of resistance and opposition (i.e. becoming one with the 
dao). 
The third rhetorical device in Laozi’s Daodejing utilizes namelessness, wu ming. It is 
a common misconception that Daoism shuns speech acts by promoting inaction. Laozi says 
in Chapter 64 Planning Ahead, “sages do not act on constructs, hence they do not wreck 
things. They do not cling and so do not lose things” (H 64.169). Daoism, when understood in 
its totality, does not condemn speech, but rather points out its limitations and suggests a 
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corrective (Lu 225). Instead of viewing the world through the socially constructed labels 
within it, Laozi promotes wu ming, or namelessness, to deconstruct constructs and 
distinguish what is real from what is fabricated. Wu ming also serves as a signifier of 
Laozi’s repudiation for the naming in Confucianism. It reminds the reader that many Daoist 
concepts are themselves a reaction to questions that have already been asked. 
For Foss and Griffin, an object’s immanent value is a part of it that cannot be 
stripped away; it is its essential nature absent any extraneous labels. In the Daodejing, wu 
ming functions as a way to strip words and ideas of their extraneous meaning so that there 
is no ambiguity between an object and the way a person understands that object. For Laozi, 
we must know the world without stepping outside our doors, “we must see natural ways 
without looking out the window. The farther one goes, the less one knows. Using this: sages 
take form without acting on constructs” (H 47.133). In order for a sage to act, he must strip 
the label off his actions and by doing so, take hold of a deeper level of agency that is only 
accessible in the moment and is absent of secular influences; it is wu ming, nameless.  
Wu ming strips labels down in order to recognize an object’s immanent value. By 
simply saying, “this over here” or “that over there,” one has constructed a normative claim 
that assumes a person knows what is meant by ‘here’ or ‘there’. Wu ming clarifies the 
general assumptions made in language to help open up an individual’s mind to the 
ambiguity around them. Once accepted, the individual can focus on the construct at hand, 
on the present, and shed the inherent risk of “clinging” to constructs. The farther one 
travels away from their own inner agency, the more they enable their own impotence in 
taking agent-oriented action.   
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 In chapter 15 Original Intent, Laozi writes, “Those in ancient times who mastered 
being scholars were mystifyingly subtle and inscrutably penetrating. So deep they cannot 
be comprehended. Generally, precisely because they cannot be comprehended…whoever 
secures this way doesn’t desire filling. Generally, precisely because unfilled, hence they can 
shroud established forms” (H 15. 67). Laozi uses a reversal in this chapter in order to 
promote wu ming. The knowledge that all thoughts are socially constructed and that they 
are impossible to escape brings the sage to a state of inaction, or wu-wei. A confrontation 
with wu ming means that all that is left from the once label-stricken object or idea is its 
immanent value, one that can only be appreciated in the moment. Recognizing that 
moment is to act on the construct, as opposed to passively acting on constructs.  
Chapter 32 Simplicity, Names and Institutions articulates the values of IR’s principle 
of immanent value and wu ming, “Ways fix on a nameless uncarved block. Although small, 
none in the social world can make it serve…As you start to institutionalize, there are names. 
As soon as there are names, generally, you really should know to stop. If you know to stop, 
you can avoid danger” (H 32.103). For Laozi, giving appellations to things is tantamount to 
building normative structures; they are valuable to the creator, but when the human crowd 
assimilates names and institutions, dogmatic thoughts arise and bring danger with them. 
The danger Laozi speaks of is equivalent to Foss and Griffin’s concern that true worth will 
be overlooked because it is something that cannot be “earned, acquired or proven”; they 
continue, “Concomitant with a recognition of the immanent value of another individual is 
the eschewal of forms of communication that seek to change that individual’s unique 
perspective to that held by the rhetor” (Foss & Griffin 4). When a rhetor infuses another’s 
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value with their conceptions it is like carving a scratch on an uncarved block. A sage should 
desire to be as clean as an uncarved block.     
For Laozi, it is social constructs that prevent people from understanding the dao. He 
asks about social constructs, “is it not like a bellow’s pipe? Emptying, it doesn’t warp. 
Moving, it produces more. Much discourse, counting to the limit, best to stay near the 
middle” (H 5.46). Laozi proposes that a sage should stay close to the middle (the center of 
their beliefs), for counting the borders and limits of all the discourse and labels in the 
exterior world does not abide by wu ming. Laozi says, “Think of the role of ways in the 
social world as like brooks and ravines flowing into rivers and oceans” (H 32.103). If all of the 
water is the same, why spend time counting all the small rivers when you can just count the 
ocean? In the end, one ends up in the exact same place, so the path with the least resistance 
is the one a sage should follow.  
Wu ming allows readers to absorb ideas without the burden of retaining or 
memorizing. Laozi carefully deployed a strategy of reversal in the Daodejing, which 
emphasized wu ming and utilized paradoxical thought patterns, to express the Daoist 
understanding of the relationship between dao and de. His method of reversing basic 
assumptions through different rhetorical devices was a way to force readers to reset their 
minds in order to make sense out of Laozi’s writings. Namelessness, as a rhetorical 
strategy, is easy to understand because it requires no prior knowledge and once 
understood, it is easy to apply to other things. Invitational rhetoric establishes a person’s 
immanent value as something that cannot be overlooked. Wu ming and the principle of 
66 
 
immanent value work hand in hand because they both invite the reader to recognize a 
central element and to further disregard any extraneous labels and meaning.    
 In Laozi’s Daodejing, he utilized reversals, paradoxes and the concept of wu ming as 
persuasive rhetorical devices gently shoving readers into the flow and confusion of the dao. 
In his writings, Laozi indirectly inserts notions of wu-wei to help readers recognize the lack 
of resistance in Daoism’s teachings. Foss and Griffin’s principles of equality and immanent 
value resonate with Laozi’s stylistic use of rhetorical devices because of a mutual desire to 
have individual’s grasp their own inner agency. IR wants people to not rely on nor worry 
about the thoughts of others so that they might value other opinions and beliefs as equal to 
their own. This ultimately allows for the development of free and non-dichotomous modes 
of thinking. 
Chuang Tzu: The Chuang Tzu    
Unlike Laozi’s Daodejing, which had designated chapters and sections strategically 
ordered to address Daoism’s core concepts, the Chuang Tzu is mostly a compilation of 
Chuang Tzu’s writings that thematically address Daoist concepts such as wu-wei, dao and 
de. Due to Chuang Tzu’s narrative style however, these concepts tend to be deeply 
embedded in his writing and provoke the reader to enthrall him or herself in a story in 
order to fully understand them. Chuang Tzu was interested in “the emancipation of the 
individual mind from conventionally accepted ideas and practices” (Lu 241). The Chuang Tzu 
teaches that words used to convey meaning in language are extraneous and something that 
one should be wary of. The irony in this is that in Chuang Tzu’s lifetime, “his work 
67 
 
amounted to approximately a hundred thousand words, many of them in the form of fables 
and parables. He was also well known for his descriptive and eloquent style of writing” (Lu 
239). This is not a fault in the Chuang Tzu, but rather a way to signify that all humans who 
use language will undoubtedly speak in a contradictory manner and thus, the natural 
paradox should be embraced. In the Chuang Tzu there are three major rhetorical devices in 
use: (1) narratives and reconstructed anecdotes; (2) an underlying skepticism of language; 
(3) a glorification of the low and ugly. These three rhetorical devices serve as the means to 
see the resonating ripples occurring between IR’s two principles of equality and immanent 
value and the Chuang Tzu.  
Chuang Tzu’s most apparent rhetorical strategy was to use stories, fables and 
reconstructed anecdotes to place readers inside what is referred to as ‘the mind of the 
sage’. Disclosing the mind of the sage was one of the predominant rhetorical themes in the 
Chuang Tzu and was enriched through narrative. It says in the Chuang Tzu, “there must be a 
True Man before there can be true knowledge” (W 77). A ‘True Man’ in the Chuang Tzu is one 
who rejects efforts to cultivate virtue or knowledge and instead acquires ‘sage-hood’ 
through a process of self-reflexivity and self-discovery (Kirkwood 8). The only way to truly 
understand a sage’s mind is to view the world as the sage would see it, through his or her 
own eyes. Chuang Tzu being a traveling man during the Warring States period of China 
most likely utilized this strategy as a means to attract the many different people who were 
in search of knowledge during that time. In a way similar to Mencius, Chuang Tzu appears 
to have been more concerned with the portrayal of his message than Laozi.  
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Like Laozi, Chuang Tzu recognizes the absurdity in being a master who promotes 
the low and emphasizes the discounted. To account for this, Chuang Tzu attempts to 
equalize the reader’s mind with the sage’s mind by providing narratives as a way for 
readers to access the world through a sage’s perspective. IR’s principle of equality wants to 
create equality in relationships by taking away the barriers (titles, rank, labels etc.) that 
create tension or oppression. For example, in the Chuang Tzu Hui Tzu said to Chuang Tzu, “I 
have a big tree called a shu. Its trunk is too gnarled and bumpy to apply a measuring line to, 
its branches, too bent and twisty to match up to a compass or square. You could stand it by 
the road and no carpenter would look at it twice” (W 29). This story begins with Chuang Tzu 
engaging in dialogue with a man who is searching for the value in something that appears 
to have no value. Chuang Tzu responds with:  
“Maybe you’ve never seen a wildcat or a weasel. It crouches down and hides, 
watching for something to come along. It leaps and races east and west, not 
hesitating to go high or low---until it falls into the trap and dies in the net. Then 
again there’s the yak, big as a cloud covering the sky. It certainly knows how to be 
big, though it doesn’t know how to catch rats. Now you have this big tree and you’re 
distressed because it’s useless. Why don’t you plant it in Not-Even-Anything Village, 
or the field of Broad-and-Boundless, relax and do nothing by its side or lie down for 
a free and easy sleep under it? Axes will never shorten its life, nothing can even 
harm it. If there’s no use for it, how can it come to grief or pain?” (W 1.30)   
In his response, Chuang Tzu implies that the mind of the sage is similar to a yak in that it 
only cares for freedom and relaxation; it does not care about catching the scurrying rats 
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nor does it know how to. At the same time, Chuang Tzu is depicted as a representation of a 
sage’s mind because he is able to point out things in the world, like the yak and the gnarled 
tree, that represent how a sage’s mind operates. In this passage the ability to recognize the 
sage’s mind simultaneously pulls the reader into a sage’s way of thinking and equalizes the 
relationship between Chuang Tzu the master/enlightened storyteller and the ignorant 
listener. 
 Another, more famous example of narrative in the Chuang Tzu is a story where 
Chuang Tzu dreamt he was a butterfly. In the dream, he was happy with himself and 
fluttered around as he pleased, unaware of his actual existence as Chuang Tzu. When 
Chuang Tzu awoke however, he was unmistakably himself, but “he didn’t know if he was 
Chuang Tzu who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Chuang 
Tzu” (W 2.49). This story illustrates the relativity of human perception through the sage’s 
mind and creates two equal relationships. Chuang Tzu goes beyond simply telling the 
reader that the line between reality and fantasy is blurred (Chuang Tzu refers to this 
process as the transformation of things) by vividly depicting a first person realization of 
life’s ambiguity from a sage’s point of view (Lu 248).  Chuang Tzu creates a relative equality 
and balance between how the reader should view the real world from the fantastical one by 
harmonizing them with Chuang Tzu’s perspective.    
In the Chuang Tzu, narratives also take the form of reconstructed anecdotes, where 
often times historical figures are placed into exaggerated and imagined stories in their 
historical and cultural context to reconstruct a narrative for greater rhetorical effect (Lu 
254). For example, Chuang Tzu tells a story about how Confucius saw a man standing atop a 
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famous waterfall in China, where shortly after viewing the man, Confucius saw him dive 
into the waters, which he assumed was meant as a means to end his life. “But after the man 
had gone a couple hundred paces, he came out of the water and began strolling along the 
base of the embankment, his hair streaming down, singing a song.” Confucius looked at the 
man stunned and asked how this was possible, to which the man replied: “I have no way. I 
began with what I was used to, grew up with my nature, and let things come to completion 
with fate. I go under the swirls and come out with the eddies, following along the way the 
water goes and never thinking about myself. That’s how I stay afloat” (W 126).   
Chuang Tzu introduces the reader to Confucius at the start of the story to put the 
sage’s mind on display in a way that forms a relationship based on equality between the 
reader and Chuang Tzu. Similarly, Confucius’s fascination with how the man survived the 
fall signifies that the actions of the man who jumped are likewise the actions of a sage. 
Therefore, in this story Chuang Tzu shows the reader that the sage’s mind is not only an 
attainable thing, but is likewise applicable for, “to behold a character’s state of mind is to 
experience it oneself, if only for a moment” (Kirkwood 16). In IR, Foss and Griffin established 
the principle of equality as a means to create relationships of equality absent oppression 
and persuasive influence. Chuang Tzu (a sage) depicts Confucius (another sage) as being 
surprised and astounded by the actions of an ordinary man. The ordinary man, however, is 
an implied depiction of the reader and Confucius’s recognition of the man’s ability is 
Chuang Tzu’s way of opening up the reader’s mind and elevating him or her to the same 
level as a sage.    
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Chuang Tzu gives the reader a way to experience what it means to “go under the 
swirls and come out with the eddies.” Offering one’s mind to another is an attempt to 
establish an equal relationship that is not based on influence or domination. The Chuang 
Tzu’s narrative style exudes a creative and fictitious atmosphere that allows readers to 
access the inner workings of a sage’s mind and see what proper accordance with dao and 
de looks like. Chuang Tzu, by offering readers a glimpse into a sage’s mind, establishes an 
underlying concept that resonates with IR’s principle of equality.    
As a second rhetorical strategy, Chuang Tzu stylistically introduces a lingering 
skepticism of language present in every instance of language use. He frequently depicts yan 
(language) and dao in relation to one another in the Chuang Tzu (in chapter 2, the word dao 
is used thirteen times, in which eleven of those times it was paralleled with a similar claim 
about yan); this connection is important because in the Chuang Tzu, yan is considered an 
obstacle and means of access to the dao, which, in turn, redefines the function of yan (Lu 
244). Similar to the cyclical nature of yin-yang, the oscillating nature of yan and dao make it 
very difficult for either yan or dao to escape from the other’s influence. The intertwining of 
yan and dao developed Chuang Tzu’s skepticism of yan forcing him to question why it must 
be intangibly linked to dao. His skepticism can most likely be partially linked to the need to 
promote Daoism against competing schools of thought such as Mohism, Legalism and 
Confucianism. Chuang Tzu embraced the Daoist system as antithetical to the way other 
schools conceptualized language. Chuang Tzu, in a way that stands out from any other 
ancient tradition, attached his skepticism of language to Daoism much like Mencius 
introduced a divine sense to the Confucian principle ren.     
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In the Chuang Tzu, language’s ability to create distinction functions as a 
dichotomizing element. It forces a natural skepticism in the reader that asks whether or not 
language can properly function as a tool for cultivating knowledge and wisdom. This 
skepticism is displayed in the Chuang Tzu when it says, “there is left, there is right, there 
are theories, there are debates, there are divisions, there are discriminations, there are 
emulations, and there are contentions” (W 2.44). The use of “contentions” shows the reader 
that when language is used to point out dichotomized opposites, the different and 
uncompromising perceptions of reality can cause likewise uncompromising mind frames. 
This state of uncompromising thought is what Chuang Tzu believed “led to conflicts and 
struggle such as wars and personal attacks at the social and individual levels” (Lu 244). 
Similar to the Daodejing, the Chuang Tzu is skeptical of socially constructed systems of 
ethics and virtue because of their reliance on language.  
Chuang Tzu’s skepticism of language (as a rhetorical device) can be divided into two 
separate concepts: wu yan (no language) and wang yan (forget language), which are used to 
“free oneself from the captivity of language, accentuate one’s attention to ideas, and allow 
things to develop by their own nature” (Lu 245). The first, wu yan, emphasizes silence in the 
Chuang Tzu, “You may speak all your life long and you will never have said anything” (W 
27.304). Chuang Tzu implies that there is a difference between speaking and speaking with 
purpose. IR’s principle of immanent value looks for the true worth in everything and never 
sees a person or object as lacking value. Therefore, by valuing wu yan, Chuang Tzu is both 
valuing the immanent value of not speaking as well as increasing the relevant worth of 
speaking whenever speech is needed. 
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From a historical standpoint, it is likely that the Chuang Tzu’s conceptualization of 
wu yan was a borrowed idea considering that Confucius likewise valued wu yan as a 
rhetorical device. In Confucius’s Analects he says to a disciple, “Does Heaven speak? Yet the 
four seasons follow their course and the hundred creatures continue to be born. Does 
Heaven speak?’” (Leys xxxi-ii)  In IR, the immanent value of something is easily overlooked; 
therefore, one must be careful to consider the worth of every being as something that is 
always present and cannot be taken away. The Chuang Tzu depicts wu yan in a similar 
manner: “Eloquence is not as good as silence. The Way cannot be heard; to listen for it is 
not as good as plugging up your ears” (W 22.240). Both Confucius and Chuang Tzu’s words 
put the emphasis on what is not being said (wu yan) in order to value the inner worth, the 
immanent value, of the dao.  
  The second concept of skepticism, wang yan (forget language), does not mean to 
abandon language in its entirety, “but rather to be free of its limitations so as to perceive 
the world of unlimited possibilities” (Lu 246). Wang yan is depicted in this Chuang Tzu 
narrative:  
The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can forget 
the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you’ve gotten the rabbit, 
you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you’ve gotten the 
meaning, you can forget the words” (W 26.302).    
In this passage, Chuang Tzu portrays yan as a carefully wrapped package where the words 
themselves represent the wrapping paper, but what is truly valuable is what lies 
underneath the paper. Chuang Tzu’s skepticism shows the reader that unless one sheds the 
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wrapping paper from the package, it is impossible to tell what truly lies behind the veil of 
yan. From Chuang Tzu’s lingering skepticism, yan becomes a tool used to effectively 
obscure meaning in the Chuang Tzu with distractions like appealing presentations and 
careful packaged words while simultaneously denouncing itself through the use of wu yan 
and wang yan. This contradiction makes language seem arbitrary to the reader, which 
consequently should make the reader more sensitive to the existence of an underlying 
worth, or an immanent value, beyond what language alone can achieve.   
Chuang Tzu glorifies the low and the ugly as a third rhetorical strategy in the 
Chuang Tzu. He gives readers a perspective that sees beauty as ugliness and physical 
deformity as completeness through the use of reversals. For Chuang Tzu, a Daoist who fully 
understands the relationship between dao and de dwells on an individual’s inner beauty 
and wisdom, rather than making judgments on the basis of outward appearance (Lu 256). 
For Foss and Griffin, the principle of immanent value is a way of taking every person, even 
those who appear invaluable, and seeing their true inner worth in order to avoid dominant 
or oppressive modes of communication. It is an endorsement of actively looking for the 
value in others, which often times can appear ugly, dispensable, or undesirable.  
The Chuang Tzu’s glorification of the low cogently aligns with IR’s principle of 
immanent value in the following dialogue between Chuang Tzu and a crippled man: “The 
Master and I have been friends for nineteen years and he’s never once let on that he’s 
aware I’m missing a foot.” To which Chuang Tzu replied, “if virtue is preeminent, the body 
will be forgotten. But when men do not forget what can be forgotten, but forget what 
cannot be forgotten---that may be called true forgetting” (W 5.75). In this story, the ability to 
75 
 
see and never forget indicates that the crippled man’s master understands dao because he 
looks beyond physical deformity and assesses the crippled man’s true worth, his immanent 
value.   
In another example illustrating the same point, an innkeeper who had two 
concubines, one beautiful and the other ugly, treated the ugly one as a proper lady, while 
the beautiful one was treated as a servant. When asked the reason, a young boy of the inn 
replied, “The beautiful one is only too aware of her beauty, and so we don’t think of her as 
beautiful. The ugly one is only too aware of her ugliness, and so we don’t think of her as 
ugly” (Lu 256 & W 20.220). Chuang Tzu portrays the innkeeper as a representation of a sage 
because, while his methods may seem cruel to the beautiful concubine and unfair to the 
ugly one, his true intention is to expand both of his concubine’s minds. Yin-yang, for 
example, is hyphenated in order to express that the two concepts exist as one; that 
everything is always in relation to itself and has two sides. The innkeeper recognizes that 
both of his concubines can only see half of themselves, the beautiful one only knows that 
she is beautiful and the ugly one only knows that she is ugly. Using a reversal, the Chuang 
Tzu portrays the innkeeper as a sage who wants his concubines to realize that they are 
both beautiful and ugly.     
  Chuang Tzu’s reversal strategy took what was seen as ugly and made it beautiful; it 
took what was seen as low and made it high and it took what was seen as useless and made 
it useful. In the following example Chuang Tzu glorifies the useless by saying, “Fool, fool---
don’t spoil my walking! I walk a crooked way---don’t step on my feet. The mountain trees 
do themselves harm; the grease in the torch burns itself up. The cinnamon can be eaten and 
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so it gets cut down; the lacquer tree can be used and so it gets hacked apart. All men know 
use of the useful, but nobody knows the use of the useless!” (W 4.63) In this passage, the 
Chuang Tzu glorifies the low and the ugly in order to indirectly invite readers to 
understand it’s meaning in a different way; one that sees the useful as useless and values 
the useless as useful. In a way comparable to Laozi’s Daodejing, the Chuang Tzu plunges its 
readers into a state of aporia and self-doubt with the hope that readers will look inward for 
answers to their confusion. In a sense, they must acknowledge their own immanent value 
before attempting to assign value claims such as “useful” or “useless”. 
In order to understand Chuang Tzu’s contradictions, readers must accept that ideals 
such as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are just half of a broader, more inclusive 
perspective. If everything is simultaneously good and bad, right and wrong, useful and 
useless, then people will not choose to value one specific idea over another. One’s 
immanent value becomes plainly visible because there is no desire to favor one side over 
another. The Chuang Tzu, in a way that resonates with Foss and Griffin’s principle of 
immanent value, reverses readers’ idea of what is beautiful and what is ugly so that any and 
every possibility is seen as unique and valuable.    
Chuang Tzu brilliantly utilized a rhetorical style that provoked his readers to 
discover for themselves what true virtue was. He combined his natural skepticism of 
language with the use of metaphors and anecdotes to portray language reversals that 
glorified the low and ugly and established puzzling contradictions and thought 
experiments. All of these were rhetorical tactics meant to show readers the inherent 
ambiguity in language so that they might look inward for answers to their own questions in 
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a time when creating new ideas was both encouraged and competitive. Foss and Griffin, in 
their efforts to equalize human relationships and recognize the value of every living being, 
display a harmonic resonance with the rhetorical values found in the Chuang Tzu. In order 
to uncover such a method, an individual must shift their reliance on external influences 
toward a direction that cultivates subjective and unique ideas. Both IR and the Chuang Tzu 
guide their readers down a path that accentuates one’s agency in the present moment.   
Conclusion 
The Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu showcase stylistic commonalities such as 
paradoxical word use, metaphorical narratives, and strategies of reversal to help readers 
discover their own unique perspective on dao and de. The Daodejing focused on employing 
a nameless strategy (wu ming) that used paradoxes and reversals in order to prevent 
readers from taking action while under the influence of social constructs. The Chuang Tzu, 
on the other hand, stressed that readers should be wary of language because of its divisive 
nature. Chuang Tzu accomplished this by using colorful portrayals of historically 
reconstructed anecdotes and narratives to emphasize the power of silence (wu yan-no 
language) and detachment (wang yan-forget language) from language. 
 As individual texts, both the Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu represent a unique 
construction that offers productive values for contemporary rhetorical scholarship. When 
the texts are juxtaposed, however, a more complete and cohesive image comes into view 
that topologically situates Laozi and Chuang Tzu as a part of a larger ancient Chinese 
rhetorical tradition; a tradition composed of “traditions”. Together, the two traditions reify 
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ancient Chinese philosophical concepts by providing stylistic similarities that resonate with 
Foss and Griffin’s contemporary invitational principles of equality and immanent value.  
Laozi and Chuang Tzu goad readers to discover their own worth and voice by 
discarding external influences and social constructs to allow for a free flowing and 
subjective mind that emphasizes non-resistance and detachment. Foss and Griffin want 
their readers to see all individuals as valuable and equal. An invitational scholar trusts that 
others are capable of governing themselves in a proper manner so that he or she may 
cultivate their own rhetorical perspective that does not try to “win” an argument. The 
bridge between IR and Daoism suggests that whenever traditional notions of rhetoric are 
de-centered in favor of other traditions, new spaces open up for rhetorical invention and 
discovery. The Daodejing and the Chuang Tzu effectively introduce rhetorical concepts that 
are not based on antagonism, force, and direct argumentation and persuasion. Instead, 
Daoist scholars apply strategies of indirectness, reversals, juxtaposition and metaphorical 
anecdotes to address core philosophical principles. The rhetorical forms of both Laozi and 
Chuang Tzu give way to a distinct ancient Chinese rhetorical style, one that resonates with 
contemporary feminist philosophers such as Foss and Griffin and offers a new platform 
from which to further jump into new levels of rhetorical insight.   
 The final section of this thesis entertains the implications of a project, like this one, 
that attempts to de-center the “traditional” Greco-Roman cannon in favor of a cross-
cultural perspective. It will also address the “problem” with a system that promotes 
inclusiveness, but specifically excludes Aristotelian rhetoric and other traditional forms 
that emphasize rhetoric as persuasion.    
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Implications  
This thesis compares the communicative traditions of ancient Confucianism and 
Daoism to Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin’s invitational rhetoric in an attempt to identify 
similarities between non-Western traditions and contemporary rhetorical scholarship. In 
the preceding chapters, I looked at the rhetorical styles of Mencius, Chuang Tzu, Laozi and 
Confucius, in which I recognized a variety of persuasive tactics ranging from the use of 
dialectical juxtaposition, strategies of reversal and metaphorical anecdotes, to an inherent 
skepticism of language that glorifies the ugly as beautiful and the useless as useful. The goal 
for both Confucian and Daoist scholars was to break down a person’s fundamental 
understanding of the world and reshape it based on a certain set of ancient Chinese 
principles: for Confucius and Mencius these would be the philosophical notions of ren, li, 
and zhong yong; for Laozi and Chuang Tzu these would be the concepts of dao, de, and wu-
wei. These principles guided followers into living ritualized lives based on either a 
righteous and moral Confucian path, or a Daoist path that has no path. The connections 
shared between Confucianism and Daoism suggest there exists a deeper chasm of 
rhetorical connections and implications to be uncovered in ancient non-Western traditions, 
many of which resemble the theories and values of contemporary scholarship. The work 
done in this thesis intervenes at the precise juncture between works done on ancient non-
Western traditions (i.e. Kennedy, Lu and Lipson) and the works of contemporary theorists 
like Foss and Griffin.    
In my research I uncovered a resonance between the ancient Confucian and Daoist 
traditions and the principles of invitational rhetoric as put forth by Sonja Foss and Cindy 
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Griffin. Their invitational values resonate in a harmonic way with Confucianism and 
Daoism’s attempt to break down social constructs through notions of wu-wei (non action), 
inner agency, and detachment from outside influences and labels. Both traditions 
established sets of principles that were intermingled with each scholar’s philosophical 
perspective and many of these principles were similar to Foss and Griffin because they 
deemphasized the role of “force” and sought to expand conversation beyond 
argumentation and persuasion. In this final section, I want to step outside this project and 
think about what it really means to find a resonance between ancient non-Western 
rhetorical traditions and the kinds of critiques that contemporary scholars have of the 
“classical” tradition. I want to emphasize that these implications are not specific to 
Confucius, Mencius, Laozi or Chuang Tzu, but are rather focused on what the implications 
are of doing this type of project as a whole. 
Three major implications resulted from the work done in this thesis, the first of 
which addresses how this project attempts to de-center Aristotelian rhetoric by utilizing 
texts that are both outside the Greco-Roman tradition and resistant to traditional 
Aristotelian conceptions of rhetoric. The foundation of the research done in the two 
preceding chapters is based on rhetorical concepts that are unrelated to the Aristotelian 
idea of rhetoric as persuasion and argumentation. For example, Confucius used 
indirectness and ambiguity as a rhetorical device to help his readers cultivate a proper 
understanding of Confucian principles such as ren and li. As a result, Confucius’s indirect 
style cultivated “silence” as a rhetorical troupe. Neither silence nor indirectness 
rhetorically function in a way that aligns with the logical, analytical and rational ideals of 
Aristotle. Laozi and Chuang Tzu, on the other hand, used paradoxes and fables in order to 
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catalyze their readers’ own inventive process and subsequent discovery of meaning on a 
subjective level void of external influences. From a Daoist perspective, when one turns 
inward for answers the idea that any one argument is correct over another through the 
“force” of argumentation is absurd. Although both traditions harmonize with contemporary 
scholars such as Foss and Griffin, neither of the two use “traditional” notions of rhetoric 
that imply rational, logical or argumentative styles of persuasion. The space in which this 
thesis resides does not need a scaffolding based on Aristotelian or traditional Greco-Roman 
rhetoric because it construct its own foundation using the influences of traditions without 
excluding any particular one. 
 Foss and Griffin have often been critiqued that IR falls victim to itself because of its 
opposition to patriarchal and oppressive forms of speech; by critiquing Aristotle, Foss and 
Griffin are further centering him. In this thesis, I aim to open up a broader dialogue for 
contemporary rhetorical traditions by de-centering Aristotelian rhetoric and focusing on 
“traditions” instead of a classical tradition. This is by no means an exclusion of Aristotelian 
and “traditional” rhetorical concepts, but rather a way of widening the range for which we 
can understand what the greater idea of “rhetoric” is.  
It is quite difficult, however, to fully escape dichotomous modes of thinking, which 
Foss and Griffin have often been critiqued for. As a result, the second implication of this 
project deals with IR’s failure to embrace its own core concept of being invitational. Foss 
and Griffin, in forwarding their idea of invitational rhetoric, do so in a polemic way that 
offers the reader one of two options: either embrace patriarchal and oppressive traditional 
rhetorical concepts, or denounce Aristotelian rhetoric in favor of an invitational style. What 
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ends up happening is that Foss and Griffin’s entire argument gets situated on a binary that 
once again emphasizes traditional rhetorical ideas because of its efforts to resist them. My 
purpose in this thesis is to embrace the idea of invitational rhetoric on a fundamental level 
that does not draw lines of opposition between rhetorical traditions, but rather allows both 
traditional and nonwestern scholars to enter into conversations that otherwise could not 
occur.  
From a cross-cultural rhetorical perspective, contemporary scholars can discuss the 
resonating and harmonic similarities between, for example, Plato and Aristotle’s use of 
dialectics in relation to ancient Chinese scholars’ use of dialectical juxtaposition. At the 
same time, scholars who push against Aristotelian notions of rhetoric can find productive 
similarities with ancient nonwestern traditions, such as IR’s three core principles that 
resonate with many of the rhetorical values found in both ancient Confucianism and 
Daoism. Furthermore, rhetorical devices such as metaphors and analogies, strategies of 
reversal, implied rituals, and appeals to morality can take on broader and more inclusive 
meaning by comparing the different ways each is used in different traditions. This thesis 
aims to embrace IR’s core principles in order to look at conversation and rhetorical theory 
in a way absent oppositional and polemic modes of thinking.     
My final implication deals with the nature of invitational rhetoric as a catch-22 of 
persuasion. Ryan and Natalle beautifully articulate this conundrum by situating IR as a 
form of philosophical hermeneutics; “(when) an interpreter tries to make sense of a text by 
constantly reassessing pre-conceived meanings in light of new ones gained in the process 
of trying to read to understand” (Ryan & Natalle 78). Foss and Griffin’s resistance to the idea of 
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persuasion establishes a set of hermeneutics based on invitational concepts that, by doing 
so, grants rhetors the ability to heuristically apply IR as a persuasive tactic. Any further 
attempt at adjusting IR in an effort to de-center persuasion merely recycles the process of 
providing new and revised means of persuasion. Once a rhetor realizes that IR is merely a 
tool to be used, then they can transcend the invitation-persuasion game of philosophical cat 
and mouse and develop a fundamentally inclusive understanding of rhetoric. IR can never 
fully be based on persuasion or invitation because it is has no purpose beyond what a 
rhetor uses it for.  
In summation, this thesis addresses the need for cross-cultural connections to be 
made in contemporary scholarship and offers examples of how such work can be done. 
This work, however, remains incomplete in order to allow room for expanding even further 
beyond the ideas put forth here. Cross-cultural scholarship does not simply provide 
answers, but rather provokes new and interesting questions. These questions fuel the 
necessary curiosity for academic exploration and provide a way to take the fundamental 
principle of inclusive thinking and apply it to nonwestern traditions, which then can be 
taken and reapplied to Western scholarship. My final thoughts suggest that the next step 
for a project such as this would be to examine the ways that IR’s three principles come back 
and affect contemporary feminist theory. In what ways do the discoveries made in Daoist 
and Confucian texts come back and contribute to feminist values and principles?  
Discussions on immanent value, self-determination and equality within certain 
feminist circles can be enriched by the work that I am doing in that many of their shared 
values are reinforced and, in some cases, take on new meaning. For example, the 
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relationship of equality and dialectical juxtaposition, found particularly in the Confucian 
texts, displays the ineffable connection between dialectical conversation and feminist 
values that seek to equalize relationships by eliminating the dominance and oppression 
that typically characterizes them. This reinforces the idea that all conversations are initially 
rooted in values of equality. Furthermore, the principle of immanent value can be 
strengthened when juxtaposed with Daoist scholars’ use of reversals that help draw out 
and make visible the value in things deemed ‘useless’, ugly’, or ‘lowly’. Understanding that 
there are two sides to every relationship, a positive and a negative, a yin and a yang, helps 
readers conceptualize what exactly feminist scholars mean when they refer to something’s 
immanent value. Both of these examples help show that the ‘cross’ in cross-cultural 
scholarship is not a one-way street, but instead travels back and forth, enriching both sides 
simultaneously through the shared values that intermingle in projects such as these. 
All four of the scholars I studied embraced (to a certain degree) the concept that an 
individual must look inward before relying on anything else. Contemporary scholarship has 
grown so large, that many valuable and unique rhetorical insights found in cultures and 
traditions other than ancient Greece or Rome are overlooked because we, as scholars, often 
fail to see the forest through the trees. If we rely too much on one way of thinking about 
rhetoric, then we are deflecting all the other ways it can be conceived. By turning to ancient 
and nonwestern traditions, many rhetorical concepts are reified in the “traditional” canon 
because of the way they were used elsewhere. Contemporary scholars should see 
“Rhetoric” as being a tapestry composed of many different traditions, all of which have 
points of intersection and juxtaposition that can offer new ways of looking at the larger 
idea of rhetorical scholarship.   
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